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LIST OF PARTIES
All parties to this appeal and to the proceedings below are listed in the case
caption. Shell Oil Company was dismissed from the proceedings below and Bill C.
Buhler did not petition for interlocutory appeal and is not a party to this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2001) (appeals from judgments over which the Court of
Appeals lacks original appellate jurisdiction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue presented on interlocutory appeal from summary judgment is: When
does the statute of limitations begin to run for a cost allocation and recovery action under
the Underground Storage Tank Act ("UST Act99)? Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-401-429
(1998) and (Supp. 2001).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate review of a trial court's summary judgment decision is de novo. "A
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a legal one and
will be reviewed for correctness." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 P.2d 731,
733 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, this Court owes no deference to the trial court's decision.
American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996). This
issue was preserved below by the petition for interlocutory review of the trial court's
ruling on Marathon's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are determinative for this appeal.
1.

Utah Underground Storage Tank Act or (the "UST Act), Utah Code Ann.

§§ 19-6-401 to 19-6-429 (1998) and (Supp. 2001) (set forth in Addendum 6).

2.

"An action may be brought within three years:
* * *

(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty
or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a different
limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1996).
3.

"The limitations in this article apply to actions brought in the name of or for

the benefit of the state or other governmental entity, the same as to actions by private
parties, except under Section 78-12-33.5."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-33 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the release of petroleum from leaking underground storage
tanks at a former gas station located at 148 East Center Street, Monticello, Utah (the
"Site"). The State of Utah (the "State") first learned of the problem in 1980. See
Deposition of K. Brent Redd, ("Redd Depo.") (R. 902, Exhibit 24 at 1.) The State did an
investigation and issued a report on the problem in 1981 which detailed its determination
that no further action was immediately necessary, however, the report noted that
additional cleanup may be required in the future. (See Redd Depo., R. 902, Exhibit 24 at
8.)

The gas station closed down in 1991 and the State was also informed by the

Southeastern Utah District Health Department that the tanks had leaked. (R. at 515, 542.)
The State, through a April, 7, 1992 letter asked Woody's Enterprises, who at the time
2

owned the Site, tc begii 1 cleai n lp of tl ic Site

(R. j i / - i o . )

The State made repeated

requests for Woody's Enterprises and Brent Redd, the Site's prior owner, to clean up the
Site, (R, at 521-40.)
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the Site from Woody's Enterprises on October 14, 1996. I he State began to clean up the
Site with its own funds by early 1995. (R. at 553.) The State waited until September 16,

After the parties had conducted limited discovery in this matter, defendants moved
Mr nummary judgment <>n the grounds that the Skih h jd Hied 'his suit beyond the
appiK,,u>ic three-year St......
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' -1 -* the State's cause of action in this case accrued each time and

oi il) vv hen a cleanup cost p^-^u-nt was made by the State. The trial couit ?;>ade no
hndihg> oi i.n.i h> its summary judgmui, <u, . ion.
STATEMF"
1.
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responsinie parts for releases of

petroleum products In in nikduj'ioiiiid slma^c Links ( 'tanks ') Ihal Viae pail ol «i U iiuer
service station located at 148 East Center Street, Monticello, I Jtah, further described as
Lot 3, Block 22, Monticello Township survey, Plat "A" Ohc "Site") 'R,, at 461 )

The State acknowledged befon tin u-.- p«... ..
Defendant Marathon Oil's Motion for Summary Judgm* -i- »• *
dispute for purposes of this statute of limitations analysis. (R. at 621.,
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2.

On June 23, 1991, six tanks were removed from the Site. (R. at 461.)

3.

No additional tanks remain at the Site. (R. at 461.)

4.

Sampling performed during removal of the tanks in 1991 indicated that

releases of petroleum products had occurred. (R. at 461.)
5.

The release was first reported to the State of Utah, Department of

Environmental Quality, Division of Environmental Response and Remediation, on July
29,1991. (R. at 461.)
6.

In December 1991, defendant Woody's Enterprises submitted a subsurface

investigation to the State. (R. at 461.)
7.

Between 1991 and 1994, plaintiffs demanded that defendants Woody's

Enterprises and Brent Redd conduct abatement, investigative, and corrective action at the
Site as required by the UST Act. (R. at 462.)
8.

Defendants Woody's Enterprises and Brent Redd did not comply with the

State's demands because they were unable or unwilling to do so. (R. at 462.)
9.

On March 18, 1993, the State informed Brent Redd that he had failed to

take abatement, investigative and corrective action required by the UST Act. (R. at 462.)
10.

In 1994, the State conducted another preliminary review of the property.

(R. at 462.)
11.

By March 1995, the State contracted with consultants Eckhoff, Watson and

Preator Engineering and began investigation and cleanup at the Site. (R. at 462.)

4

12.

Plaintiffs did not file this si lit m iiit.il September 1(>, i w o . (R. at 793.)
SI JMMARY O F T H E A R G U M E N T

Faced i ith deten ninii lg \ \ 1 len tl le State' s cause of actioi i acci i led I it idei the I IS- T
A

c t, the trial coin t iiiiproperly ruled that the State has an unlimited number of causes of

action and that each cause of action accrues when the State paid a bill for cleanup costs.
..I oLtumilling "what date the State s cause of action accrued, the trial coi n t 1 lad
ni ni ill in y .illrinntives mill nl.ifrs iiv.uLnblli In

huosc from

Flie e v ents that the ti ial court

could have selected as the last event necessary to t o m p l u - the Slate* - cause of action are
listed and described in hxhibn

-i > include: (1) Brent Redd mloinung ifu M,»u iiuit
I

.

.

-

'

'
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O

conip* • with the o o l Act, ^j) the Statu deciding to perforin Ab ^v\i, e k a i i u r , (4) the
State obtaining funding for the cleanup; (5) State contractors commencing cleanup at the
•.

. t

i

State funds at the site; (8) State approval of contractor invoices for site cleanup; Wi the
State's payment of contractor invoices; and (10) each payment by the State, regardless of
In i1, lliiiiif ineidui

.yii'i nl Ilk >i. a n n u l dales, exu pi lln Lid

iillill liiiiii llln Stales

claim. The trial court disregarded the first nine alternatives and chose the tenth, the only
accrual theory that allowed the State's claim to survive,
I he trial coi n I s ruling creates an unworkable sit uation and effecti v el> v itiates tl le
t,
(whether they involve the State or private parties). Under the trial court's ruling, any
5

party can delay cleanup of a leaking tank until the latest possible time, then extend that
time by refusing to make payment until the last possible moment.
As described below, Marathon posits that the statute of limitations began running
either (1) upon the State's initiation of cleanup activities; or (2) by the failure of the Site's
"current owners" (Brent Redd and Woody's Enterprises) to perform cleanup which was
demanded by the State in 1993.
Both positions are supported by applicable law and comport with the public policy
behind the statute of limitations. Whatever else this Court determines, and regardless of
which alternative this Court chooses, the current decision of the trial court should not be
affirmed. The practical effect of such a ruling is unpalatable and contradictory to the
public policy behind the statute of limitations.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE'S CLEANUP WORK AT THE SITE IN EARLY 1995 WAS
THE LAST EVENT NECESSARY TO TRIGGER THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
A.

Statutes of Limitations Are Designed to Prevent Surprise Litigation
After Witnesses Have Disappeared, Documents Have Been Lost, and
Memories Have Faded

It is well settled that statutes of limitations are vital for ensuring that justice is
administered fairly and efficiently.
The governing policy in this area, as declared by the United
States Supreme Court, is that statutes of limitations 'are
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses

6

have disappeared.'
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Railroad Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). As described below,
Marathon has suffered the exact consequences of the delay that the statute of limitations
is meant to prevent.
During the brief period of discovery prior to the defendants' motions for summary
judgment, Marathon learned that virtually all potentially useful information related to the
operational history of the Site had been lost. Prior to this time, but after the State
determined that cleanup of the Site was necessary, documents were destroyed and
witnesses died or became impossible to find. For example, in 1997, Brent Redd burned
30 boxes of documents that related to operations at the Site. (See Redd Depo., R. 902 at
112-15).

Ron Van Wagonner, the only known individual with extensive firsthand

knowledge about the tanks, including tank system design, repairs, changes, and removal,
died approximately four years ago. This is especially significant in that he performed the
actual removal of the tanks in 1991. Other witnesses, such as Paul Redd and Verlynn
Banks—both of whom where heavily involved with Abajo Petroleum, the company that
handled the administration of the former service station—have moved away and their
exact whereabouts are no longer known. (See Redd Depo., R. 902 at 119-20). Moreover,
they are probably no longer subject to the subpoena power of the Utah courts.
Even parties to this litigation (such as Brent Redd) who worked at the Site and
have extensive firsthand experience with the Site, have forgotten much information in the
7

intervening years and are unable to recall many details. (See, e.g., Redd Depo., R. 902 at
117-40.) Brent Redd's answer to numerous questions about activities at the Site,
management of the Site, insurance for the Site and the status and location of other
witnesses he worked with at the Site was often "I don't know," "I don't remember," or "I
don't recall." Id. An opportunity to depose Brent Redd and other individuals with
knowledge about the Site at an earlier time would likely have been much more
productive.

All of these events were out of Marathon's control, occurred prior to

Marathon's knowledge of the State's claim, and occurred during the window of time in
which the State should have filed its claim.
1.

The State's Claim Is Subject to a Three-Year Statute of
Limitations

Pursuant to the UST Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-401-429, the State is seeking
reimbursement of "all expenditures from the LUST Trust and PST Funds that have been
and will in the future be made to investigate, abate and remediate the petroleum releases
and contamination caused by the Facility in Monticello, Utah."

(First Amended

Complaint, R. at 121.) The applicable statute of limitations for plaintiffs' claims is three
years. "An action may be brought within three years . . . for a liability created by the
statutes of this state . . . " Utah Code Ann.§ 78-12-26(4) (1996). The State agrees that
this is the applicable statute of limitations.
Additionally, there is no question that statutes of limitations apply to government
entities the same as they do to private parties. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-12-33 (1996). The
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precedent set by this case affects all cost allocation actions under the UST Act, including
those brought both by the State and private parties. The consequence of allowing the
State's claim in this case will be elimination of the statute of limitations as it applies to all
cost allocation actions. Private parties will no longer be required to bring a claim within
three years of learning that cleanup will be required for gasoline that has leaked from
tanks that are, or have been, on their property. In a position identical to the State's,
parties will be able to wait indefinitely and revive their claims through belated spending.
2.

The Statute of Limitations Begins to Run upon the Last Event
Necessary to Complete the Cause of Action

A limitations period normally runs from the date of accrual, which is the
"happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Warren v. Provo
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Utah 1992). This rule is intended to further the
policy of "preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared." Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. "As a general rule, a cause of action accrues when
a plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion."
DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996).
Accordingly, the issue before this Court is whether the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action occurred more than three years prior to plaintiffs' filing of
this suit on September 16, 1998. The undisputed facts of this case make it clear that the
State's cause of action accrued prior to September 16, 1995, and their claims, therefore,

9

are time-barred.

The State "could have first filed and prosecuted [this] action to

successful completion" by early 1995, when it decided to clean up the Site itself. DOIT,
926 P.2d at 843. Just as the plaintiffs in DOIT were held to have a viable cause of action
upon learning of the defendants' state securities violations, the State's cause of action
was completed when the State determined it would conduct its own cleanup of the Site.
Nothing of importance happened in the intervening period between early 1995 and
September 16, 1998 that created a cause of action for the State that was not already
actionable in the courts by early 1995 when the State initiated its cleanup activities.
B*

Under Utah Law the State's Cause of Action Accrued When the State
Began Cleanup Activities at the Site

Over ten years ago, defendant Woody's Enterprises removed all of the tanks from
the Site. (R. at 461.) On July 29, 1991, Rick Meyer, a Southeastern Utah District Health
Department employee, reported the release at the Site to the State. (R. at 515, 542.) The
State assigned its employee, Mike Pfeiffer, to monitor the Site. (R. at 515.)
Defendant Woody's Enterprises contracted with Wasatch Geotechnical, Inc., to
investigate the Site, and provided a report of this investigation to the State on or about
December 10, 1991. (R. at 461.)

The report confirmed that significant levels of

petroleum were present in the environment at the Site.

(R. at 479.)

The report

summarized the risks posed by the site stating, "site sensitivity analysis . . . indicates a
Level I (highest) Environmental Site Sensitivity for the Woody's #126 site." (R. at 482,
emphasis added.) In its conclusions the Report stated:

10

Investigations to date indicate significant petroleum
hydrocarbon release and groundwater impact at the Woody's
#126 gasoline station. Chemical analysis of collected soil and
groundwater samples indicate hydrocarbon concentrations
above State RCLs and Federal Drinking Water Standards.
The hydrocarbon chemistry patterns appear to be complex,
and indicate two primary release source areas: Excavation 1
and the dispenser area. Integrated patterns further indicate
hydrocarbon migration at depth toward the east and northeast
at least to the property boundary.
Further investigation will likely be required by the Utah
Division of Environmental Response and Remediation to
determine the full extent of impacted soil and groundwater
both down gradient (east, northeast) and laterally (north and
south). Additional investigation up gradient (northwest) may
be advised to explore the possibility for off-site sources
impacting the Woody's #126 property through migration
along the Central Street utility corridor.
(R. at 483.) Despite these serious concerns, which were identified and forwarded to the
State in December 1991, and Woody's Enterprises' inability or unwillingness to take any
additional action at the Site, the State took no action. Additionally, the State did not seek
any legal action against Woody's Enterprises or Brent Redd. Remarkably, the State
failed to contact Marathon about this issue.
Between 1991 and 1994, the State sent numerous letters demanding defendants
Woody's Enterprises and Brent Redd clean up the Site. (R. at 462.) The State warned
Brent Redd of his UST Act violations in 1993 and stated that he would "be subject to cost
recovery of all funds expended by the State of Utah." (R. 543.) Throughout this period,
however, the State never sought any legal recourse and made no attempts to find or
contact Marathon. (R. at 465.) The State continued to devote resources to the Site,

11

however, and revisited the Site in September 1994. (R. at 462.) Based on this visit to the
Site it was determined that "this facility be considered for State or Federal monies, so that
appropriate abatement and remedial steps can be taken, to protect human health and the
environment." (R. at 550.) By this point the State had received multiple replies from
defendant Brent Redd indicating that he was unwilling or unable to pay for cleanup of the
Site. (R. at 550.) Furthermore, the State had a rough cost estimate of $150,000 to clean
up the Site. (R. at 551.) However, the State still failed to make any effort to contact
Marathon or initiate a liability allocation against any defendants.
By March 1995, plaintiffs' consultant Eckhoff, Watson and Preator Engineering
was performing cleanup work at the Site. (R. at 462.) Based on this information, the
statute of limitations for the State's claim for allocation of liability against Marathon ran
as of March 1998 at the latest, because the State's claim fully accrued outside the statute
of limitations period. As this Court has stated in numerous opinions, the statute of
limitations begins to run as soon as the plaintiff can pursue its claim successfully in court.
See, e.g., DOIT, 926 P.2d at 843 (holding that plaintiffs' knowledge of securities
violations triggered the statute of limitations as plaintiffs "could have first filed and
prosecuted an action to successful completion"); Myers, 635 P.2d at 86-87 (holding that
"a cause of action accrues upon the last event necessary to complete the cause of action"
unless the plaintiff has no means of discovering the facts creating the cause of action).
The State had the same claim in 1998 as it had by early 1995, and its failure to pursue this

12

claim within the statute of limitations period bars the State's claim. The State's decision
to delay cleanup of the Site and the fact that cleanup still remains to be done, does not
provide the State with an exemption from the statute of limitations at Marathon's
expense. Such a result would effectively allow parties to wait indefinite periods before
initiating action at a Site or seeking allocation of costs under the UST Act.
The State has argued that its cause of action is similar to a continuing nuisance or
trespass, in an effort to take advantage of the variable accrual date afforded by this cause
of action. (R. at 623.) The State is wrong. There is nothing continuing about this injury.
In Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995), appealed on other
grounds after remand, 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998), this Court addressed the issue of
when the statute of limitations accrues for an environmental claim based on the common
law causes of action of nuisance or trespass. Walker was based upon the intrusion of a
plume of gasoline onto neighboring properties from two gas stations in Moab, Utah. A
property owner affected by the plume sued for damages resulting from the contamination.
Walker, 902 P.2d at 1230-31. Although this case did not involve the UST Act, the statute
of limitations is still triggered "upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action." Walker, 902 P.2d at 1231 (citing Warren v. Provo City
Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992)). This Court held that "[w]hen a cause of action
for nuisance or trespass accrues for statute of limitations purposes depends on whether
the nuisance or trespass is permanent or continuing." Walker, 902 P.2d at 1232.

13

The State's attempt to analogize its claim to a continuing nuisance or trespass is
irreconcilable with its claim for all damages—past and future. (R. at 120-21.) As this
Court stated in Walker, claims based on theories of continuing harm are limited to injury
suffered within the last three years. Walker, 902 P.2d at 1232; see also Capogeannis v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). The State's claim seeks
all past and future costs associated with the Site. According to Walker, this type of
remedy is analogous to a permanent nuisance or trespass.
Permanent trespass or nuisance claims accrue from the time the nuisance is created
or discovered. See Walker, 902 P.2d at 1232. This issue was revisited in Walker Drug
Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998) ("Walker II"), and this Court
clarified that the plaintiffs' property must be subject to a continuing intrusion of gasoline
from the neighboring gas stations before damages based on a temporary or continuing
harm were available. The Walker II parties stipulated for the damages phase of the trial
that contamination continued to enter the property from the neighboring gas stations as
petroleum products were released from the "smear zone" due to water table fluctuations.
Walker II, 972 P.2d at 1241, 1247. Without this continued invasion from off-site
sources, the Walkers would have had no basis for recovering damages resulting from a
continuing injury. See Walker II, 972 P.2d at 1247.
No such off-site invasion is occurring at the Site. Therefore, the continuing injury
doctrine from Walker is not applicable. Although the Walkers were not seeking cost
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allocation under the UST Act, this Court described that in any case, the underlying facts
causing economic harm (here, the release of gasoline from the tanks) forms the cause of
action, not the economic harm that may be claimed many years later. See Walker II, 972
P.2d at 1248.
Another case, Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996), cited by the
State in its trial court brief, is also instructive as to why a variable accrual date is
unworkable. Seale was a medical malpractice case involving the misdiagnosis of cancer.
It clearly states that only one cause of action exists for any given injury and the
underlying claim must cover all current and future damages. See Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364
("once some harm is manifest, the limitations period begins to run on all claims, present
and future.") This Court's analysis in Seale makes perfect sense. Without such a rule,
claims would never become final. Not only would parties be surprised by unknown, stale
claims from many years ago, but parties would be subject to repeated claims based upon
the same injury and underlying events. Litigation on any given case would have no
definite conclusion.
While the State's claim is based on the UST Act, the principle behind the
applicable statute of limitations is the same—once a party is aware that it has been
injured it must seek all of its damages in one cause of action. The State's approach to
this case is analogous to an accident victim who makes a claim for orthopedic injuries in
one year, and subsequently claims extensive neurological injuries from the same accident
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in a separate lawsuit several years later. Such an approach, whether under common law
or the UST Act, is simply unworkable. Once a party has been injured it must pursue all
claims, present and future.
As set forth in Exhibit 1, the date on which the State was injured could be as early
as November 13, 1992 and as late as June 21, 1995. In any event, the State's claims did
not accrue after September 16, 1995. The State has filed such an action for all claims,
present and future. However, it has failed to do so in a timely fashion.
The State could have easily avoided the statute of limitations issue in this case by
initiating the very same liability allocation proceeding currently before this Court at an
earlier time—within the statute of limitations. There is no ongoing harm in this case in
that no gasoline was released after the tanks were removed in 1991. The State is simply
incurring costs related to conditions that the State has been keenly aware of since 1991.
In sum, the State has no applicable legal basis to avoid the statute of limitations by
incurring costs for a gasoline release that ended over ten years ago.
C,

Other Jurisdictions Properly Start the Statute of Limitations from the
Time a Plaintiff Knows It Will Be Required to Clean Up a Site

Minnesota is but one example of a state that has addressed the issue of when a
statute of limitations begins to run under environmental cleanup statutes which, similar to
the Utah UST Act, do not contain an express statute of limitations provision. In Union
Pacific R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1998) affd, 215 F.3d
830 (8th Cir. 2000), the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
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addressed the issue of when a cost recovery claim under an environmental cleanup statute
(similar to the Utah UST Act) accrued for statute of limitations purposes. The court held
that since the Minnesota cleanup statute did not limit a party to only liability for costs it
had previously incurred, and since the statute recognized that a party may sue under the
statute before any response costs are incurred at all, the statutory cleanup cost
reimbursement claims were properly timed by the same accrual date as common law
causes of action. Union Pacific, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 865. The court held that the plaintiffs
reimbursement claims for cleanup costs were time-barred if the plaintiff knew it would
incur response costs outside of the statute of limitations period. Id
The similarities between the Minnesota statute interpreted by the Union Pacific
court and Utah's UST Act are compelling. The UST Act also does not limit a party to
only liability for costs it had previously incurred and recognizes that a party may sue
under the statute before any response costs are incurred at all. Utah Code Ann.§§ 19-6420, 19-6-424.5 (1998). Accordingly, the State's claims under the Act, regardless of
whether they are statutory or common law-based, accrued upon the State's knowledge of
the release, or initiation of cleanup at the latest, and are time barred. (R. at 461.)
Additional jurisdictions have arrived at the same conclusions and held that a new
cause of action is not created by subsequent damages arising out of the same underlying
injury. In Carpenter v. Texaco, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 398 (Mass. 1995), the plaintiff sought to
preserve claims under the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention
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Act as well as common law claims by asserting that the persistence and mobility of
gasoline on her property was analogous to a continuing nuisance, perpetuating her cause
of action. Id. at 399. The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating:
a continuing trespass or nuisance must be based on recurring
tortious or unlawful conduct and is not established by the
continuation of harm caused by previous but terminated
tortious or unlawful conduct. The cases on which the
plaintiffs rely concern not a single encroachment resulting in
permanent harm but rather repeated or recurrent wrongs
involving new harm to property on each occasion. The
gasoline on the plaintiffs' property is the consequence of
tortious conduct and of seepage that occurred before 1985.
There is, therefore, no continuing trespass or nuisance.
We decline to recognize for the first time a continuing
trespass or continuing nuisance concept in the circumstances
such as exist in this case, in part, because, in adopting a three
year statute of limitations in 1992 for private actions under
G.L. c. 2IE, the Legislature stated a guiding public policy.
There is no distinguishing reason to justify our granting relief
under a label of continuing nuisance in this case when the
Legislature did not recognize a similar concept of a
continuing wrong under G.L. c. 21E in its 1992 enactment of
a statute of limitations for G.L. c. 2 IE.
Carpenter, 646 N.E.2d at 399-400 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).
Likewise, as the State has admitted in its opposition filing, they seek damages relating to
conditions that have not changed since 1991, when the tanks were removed. (R. at 621.)
If the Utah legislature intended to provide plaintiffs with a continuing cause of action it
would have written it into the UST Act.
Colorado courts have also held that claims are time-barred if they are based upon
underground storage tank releases from that occurred outside of the statute of limitations
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period.

Kohler v. Germain Inv. Co., 934 P.2d 867, 869-70 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

Kohler is similar to Walker and Walker II in that the plaintiffs' claims for damages
resulting from gasoline releases were based on common law causes of action. However,
the principle is just as instructive. In Kohler, plaintiffs received a report documenting
gasoline contamination on their property in August of 1989. Kohler, 934 P.2d at 868.
The plaintiffs received a second report in July 1993 that documented additional
contamination that was determined to have occurred sometime after December 1991.
Kohler, 934 P.2d at 868-69. The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in November 1993. Kohler,
934 P.2d at 868. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs' knowledge of
gasoline releases affecting their property triggered the statute of limitations in 1989.
Kohler, 934 P.2d at 869-70. However, releases occurring after December 1991, as
documented in the 1993 report, constituted a new cause of action accruing within the
statute of limitations period which was not time-barred. Kohler, 934 P.2d at 870.
In this case, the same rule applies. The State received notification of a release in
1980 and again in 1991. (Redd Depo., R. 902, Exhibit 24 at 1; R. at 461.) In 1991 the
State also received a report documenting an investigation of the release. (R. at 461.)
However, unlike Kohler, no additional gasoline was released after 1991 when the tanks
were removed from the Site. Thus, the State of Utah's claim is entirely time-barred.
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D.

The State's Lack of Property Interest in the Site Does Not Affect the
Statute of Limitations

In its papers filed with the trial court, the State argued that cases such as Walker
are inapposite because the State does not have a property interest in the Site. (R. at 622.)
The State tries to distinguish itself as a party that has no property interest in the Site and
as such deserves special treatment similar to a common law indemnitee whose claim does
not accrue until payment of the obligation. (R. at 622-24.). The State's position is
irrelevant. Utah law specifically requires that the State be subject to the same statutes of
limitations as private parties. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-12-33. There is no exception based
on property ownership and the State does not deserve special treatment.
1.

The State's Claim Against Marathon Is Not Analogous to an
Indemnity Action

On October 11, 2000, the trial court notified the parties of its rulings on the
defendants' motions for summary judgment. In its ruling on Marathon's motion, the trial
court stated that it was "persuaded that the plaintiffs' cause of action in this case accrued
when a cleanup cost payment was made by the plaintiffs." (R. at 817.) In its ruling on
Brent Redd's motion the trial court provided slightly more detail on this analysis and
stated that it was "persuaded that the law of indemnification applies and. . . that each
payment is the accrual of a new cause of action under UCA 78-12-26(4)." (R. at 811.)
The trial court's reliance on the indemnity theory is incorrect. The UST Act,
which is the sole basis for the State's claims, makes no mention of indemnity. Rather, it
provides a statutory vehicle, authorized by the Utah Legislature, for the State to directly
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recover cleanup costs. The Court's analysis of the State's argument need not proceed
further.
However, even if the substance of the argument is reviewed, indemnity has no
place in this case. Common law indemnity in the tort context typically arises when an
innocent party is legally obligated to pay for the damages suffered by a victim whose
injuries are entirely attributable to the wrongdoing of a third party tortfeasor.

See

generally Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Remedies § 3.10(3).
In actions for indemnity, courts universally require proof of
three elements: (1) the payor (prospective indemnitee) must
discharge a legal obligation the payor owes to a third person;
(2) the prospective indemnitor must also be liable to the third
person; and (3) as between the claimant payor and the
prospective indemnitor, the obligation ought to be discharged
by the indemnitor.
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984) (emphasis
added) (citing Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. v. Indian Head Cattle Co., 627 P.2d 469, 475 (Or.
1981). The State's claim involves no third party victim that would create a situation
analogous to common law indemnity. Rather the State's claim is for direct cost recovery
of its own discretionary expenditures under the UST Act. If the State can avoid the
statute of limitations by masquerading its claim as common law indemnification, it
appears that almost any type of claim, based in tort, contract, or statute, can be similarly
tortured to avoid the statute of limitations. Accordingly, common law indemnity has no
bearing on the State's claims.
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2.

The State's Claim Against Marathon Is Based upon Subrogation
Not Indemnification

If indeed this Court chooses to analogize this matter to common law claims, the
State's cost recovery action against Marathon is more accurately based on subrogation,
which places the State in the shoes of a party with a property interest in the Site, and
subjects the State to the same limitations as that party. Accordingly, the statute of
limitations has run for all claims against Marathon.
The UST Act expressly characterizes the State's claim as one based upon
subrogation. The UST Act states: "If any payment is made under this part, the fund2 shall
be subrogated to all the responsible parties' rights of recovery against any person or
organization..." Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-426(7) (1998) (footnote added). The State's
First Amended Complaint alleges that "funds have been expended from 1) appropriated
excess funds from the Petroleum Storage Tank ("PST") Fund which was created by Utah
Code Ann. § 19-6-409 and has been administered under authority of Utah Code Ann.
§ 19-6-420, and 2) the Leaking Underground Storage Tank ("LUST") Trust Fund

"

(R. at 120.) The State seeks recovery of "all expenditures from the Lust [sic] Trust and
PST Funds that have been and will in the future be made

2

" (R. at 121.)

"'Fund' means the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund created in Section 19-6-409."
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-402(15) (1997).
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Accordingly, as a subrogee, the State is treated no differently for statute of
limitations purposes than any private party seeking cost allocation under the UST Act.
As described above, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time contamination
is discovered and a party knows it will be required to pay for cleanup. The State had
mobilized its own investigation and cleanup of the Site by early 1995. This activity starts
the statute of limitations. The State is not eligible for any exceptions from the rule that
the statute of limitations accrues with the last event necessary to complete the cause of
action as it is in the same position as the private party subrogor.
II.

ADDITIONALLY, UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UST ACT,
THE STATE'S CLAIM ACCRUED ON MARCH 18, 1993 WHEN THE
STATE DETERMINED THAT THE SITE OWNER WAS UNWILLING OR
UNABLE TO CLEAN UP THE SITE
Additionally, under the explicit language of the UST Act, the State's claim is time

barred three years after the State determined that the Site owner was unwilling or unable
to clean up the Site.
The State's claim is based entirely on the UST Act. The UST Act authorizes the
State to order private parties to investigate and remediate releases from tanks. Utah Code

3

Brent Redd entered into an indemnity agreement with Husky Oil Company, Marathon's
predecessor, when he purchased the Site in 1984. (See Redd Depo. R. 902, Exhibit 6.)
In the indemnity agreement Brent Redd "assumes all responsibility and liability of
whatsoever kind. . . " from Husky Oil Company. By stepping into the shoes of Brent
Redd, the State is also limited by the indemnity agreement, which bars any claim for cost
allocation against Husky and Marathon. See, e.g., Howard P. Foley Co. v. EmployersCommercial Union, 488 P.2d 987, 989 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that the subrogor is
subject to the same limitations and obligations as the subrogee).
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Ann. § 19-6-420 (1998). The State is also authorized to initiate legal proceedings to
allocate liability and recover past and future costs related to investigation and cleanup of
the tanks. Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-420 and 19-6-424.5 (1998). Specifically, the UST
Act states:
(2)
Regardless of whether the tank generating the release
is covered by the fund, the executive secretary may:
(a)
order the owner or operator to take abatement,
investigative, or corrective action, including the submission
of a corrective action plan; and
(b)
if the owner or operator fails to take any of
the abatement, investigative, or corrective action ordered
by the executive secretary, the executive secretary may
take any one or more of the following actions:
(i)
subject to the conditions in this part, use
monies from the fund, if the tank involved is covered by the
fund, state cleanup appropriation, or the Petroleum Storage
Tank Cleanup Fund created under Section 19-6-405.7 to
perform investigative, abatement, or corrective action;
(ii)

commence an enforcement proceeding;

(iii) enter into agreements or is sue orders as
allowed by Section 19-6-424.5; or
(iv) recover costs from responsible parties
equal to their proportionate share of liability as
determined by Section 19-6-424.5.
Utah Code Ann.§ 19-6-420(2) (1998) (emphasis added).
It is important to note that by linking the State's alternative courses of action with
"or," the UST Act authorizes the State to initiate its cause of action as soon as the owner
fails to take any action ordered by the State. The allocation provisions of the UST Act
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focus on liability, not previously incurred response costs. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-6424.5(2) (1998). If the UST Act required the State to meet some threshold of expenditure
prior to pursuing an allocation claim under § 19-6-424.5, the Utah Legislature would
have included such language.4 Furthermore, if the UST Act only allowed the State to
pursue liability allocation upon past expenditures, all of the State's claims in this case for
future costs would be premature. Accordingly, the State's cause of action under the UST
Act accrues as soon as the "owner or operator fails to take any of the . . . action ordered
by the executive secretary [plaintiff]," and the three-year statute of limitations begins to
run. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420(2) (1998).
On March 18, 1993, the State sent a letter to Brent Redd stating that his "failure to
comply with the requirements of the [UST A c t ] . . . may result in the issuance of a notice
of agency action or order and the assessment of a civil penalty." (R. at 543.) The State
also stated that he would "be subject to cost recovery of all funds expended by the State
of Utah." (R. at 543.) For several years leading up to this letter, the State had repeatedly
requested that Brent Redd clean up the Site. (R. at 462.) In 1991, the State also
requested that defendant Woody's Enterprises clean up the Site. In that request, the State
provided an extensive description of what was required for the cleanup. (R. at 462.) The
State repeatedly contacted defendants Woody's Enterprises and Brent Redd, each time

Other jurisdictions have specified when the cost recovery action accrues. Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 2IE, § 11A (1992). Utah could have adopted similar language and modeled a
statute of limitations provision after such a statute, however, the legislature elected to
remain silent as to this issue.
25

demanding that they clean up the Site. (R. at 462.) Brent Redd replied to the State that
he was unwilling or unable to clean up the Site. Redd Depo. (R. 902 at p. 147). The
State expressly told Brent Redd that in light of his violations of the UST Act "the
Executive Secretary (UST) has the authority to seek a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00
for each day of violation of the [UST] Act..." (R. at 543.) Based on these facts and the
State's extensive knowledge of the Site's conditions and risks, the State's cause of action
began to accrue at this point under Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420(2), which explicitly
provides for allocation of past and future cleanup costs among responsible parties if the
owner fails to clean up the Site.
By the State's own words expressed in its correspondence with Brent Redd
regarding his "failure to comply with the requirements of the [UST Act]," the State's
cause of action accrued no later than this date, meaning that the statute of limitations ran
for this case on March 18, 1996. The State has no reason for its lengthy delay in filing its
claims. All elements necessary for plaintiffs' cause of action—a leaking tank, the need
for cleanup, and failure of the Site owner to clean up the Site as requested by the State—
occurred by Spring of 1993 at the latest. The language of the UST Act requires nothing
else for the State's cause of action. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420(2) (1998).
This Court has held that when the legislature plainly articulates the elements of a
cause of action created expressly by statute, no additional requirements can be construed
as necessary for the cause of action to accrue. Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah
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1996). To impose additional requirements would contradict the legislative intent of what
is necessary for a cause of action to accrue. Gohler, 919 P.2d at 563. In this case, the
UST Act does not require the State to perform cleanup activities prior to initiating a cost
allocation proceeding against potentially responsible parties. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6420(2)(b) (1998). Accordingly, the State's action accrued no later than the Spring of
1993, upon the failure of the Site owner to clean up the Site as required by the State.
There are no grounds in the UST Act for imposing additional requirements for the cause
of action to accrue or to delay the statute of limitations.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT COMPORT WITH THE
PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The result of the trial court's ruling is readily apparent in the facts of this case. If

the trial court's ruling is allowed to stand, sites such as this one will be ignored or
suppressed for long periods of time, five, ten, perhaps even twenty years. Pursuant to the
trial court's ruling as it currently stands, by simply spending a little more money, a party
can indefinitely extend any dispute under the UST Act. The remedial intent of the UST
Act will be lost and petroleum releases will be uncontrolled while parties, including the
State, can delay action on contaminated sites. Furthermore, parties such as Marathon are
prejudiced by the loss of evidence and witnesses that would allow them to prove that
their proportionate share of liability is much lower than what is allocated to them once
evidence has been lost and memories have faded.
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However, if the trial court's ruling is corrected to recognize the rule that the cause
of action accrues under the UST Act when the State—or a private party—determines that
it will be required to initiate cleanup, gasoline releases will be cleaned up in a timely
fashion and cost allocation claims will be predictably filed within several years of a
gasoline release. Such a rule would not preclude a party from recovering its costs under
the UST Act—it simply requires parties to be timely in their assessment of the Site.
Another benefit of such a rule is the earlier notification of potentially responsible parties.
This increases the potential for settlement and efficient allocation of costs without further
burdening the courts with complicated disputes over historical operations and liability.
While the effects of statutes of limitations are occasionally unpalatable, it is a
time-honored maxim that without their protection, parties would be exposed to stale
claims and surprise litigation.

Under Utah law, many plaintiffs who bear no

responsibility for their injuries are regularly barred from pursuing claims they have
waited too long to file. For example, in most cases victims of medical malpractice cannot
pursue their claims more than four years after the date of the alleged malpractice, even if
they are unaware of their injury.

Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4(1) (1996). Moreover,

wrongful death claims must be filed within two years of the decedent's death. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-28(2) (Supp. 2001). The State's claims enjoy no special protection either.
This Court has faced other difficult statute of limitations cases in the past and held that
Utah's statutes of limitations must bar claims that have been allowed to lapse. See, e.g.,
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Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) (denying claim of
employee for conversion by employer of patented discovery). In some cases these claims
involve individuals who did not fully understand their rights or the extent of the injury
they had suffered. See United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d
880, 890 (Utah 1993).
Regardless of the State's assertions that it would be unfair for it to bear the
cleanup costs for the Site, the State has had full control over the timing and nature of the
cleanup action. The State's control over this site and the State's extraordinary delay has
cost Marathon its ability to conduct adequate discovery in this case and compromised
efforts at determining a fair allocation of liability.

Considering that the statute of

limitations is intended to apply equally to private parties and the government, it is
manifestly unjust to burden Marathon with the result of the State's delay.
Furthermore, allowing the State's claim in this case will only open the door to
future cost allocation claims from the State and private parties that are based upon facts
even older and more obscured by time. Accordingly, the statute of limitations must be
evenly applied. Failure to uniformly apply the statute of limitations would jeopardize the
legal system by overwhelming it with stale demands. See United States v. Brockamp,
519 U.S. 347, 353 (1997).
The United States Supreme Court has summarized the necessity for a strong rule
on statutes of limitations as follows:
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On many prior occasions, we have emphasized the
importance of the policies underlying state statutes of
limitations.
Statutes of limitations are not simply
technicalities. To the contrary, they have long been respected
as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system. Making out
the substantive elements of a claim for relief involves a
process of pleading, discovery, and trial. The process of
discovery and trial which results in the finding of ultimate
facts for or against the plaintiff by the judge or jury is
obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony in
question is relatively fresh. Thus in the judgment of most
legislatures and courts, there comes a point at which the delay
of a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently likely either to
impair the accuracy of the fact-finding process or to upset
settled expectations that a substantive claim will be barred
without respect to whether it is meritorious.
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) (emphasis added). This Court
should hold similarly and apply the statute of limitations to the State's claim.
CONCLUSION
The trial court improperly held that the statute of limitations was triggered only
when the State made a cleanup cost payment. Such a ruling vitiates the policy behind the
statute of limitations and rewards the State for delay. This Court should reverse the trial
court's order and conclude that the State is precluded from recovering any cleanup costs
because it did not file its action within three years of the date its claims accrued.
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DATED this [O

day of August, 2001.

DAVID W. TUNDIRMANN
J. MICHAEL BAILEY
RICHARD J. ANGELL
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Marathon Oil Company
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ADDENDUM

1.

Exhibit 1 Comparison of Potential Accrual Dates to the Date's Actual

Filing Date of September 16, 1998
2.

Ruling on Defendant Marathon Oil Company's Motion for Summary

Judgment
3.

Conclusions of Law and Order on Marathon Oil Company's Motion for

Summary Judgment
4.

Ruling on Defendant K. Brent Redd and Woody's Enterprises Ltd's Motion

for Summary Judgment, and Ruling on Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Randy Gordon
5.

Conclusions of Law and Order on K. Brent Redd and Woody's Motion for

Summary Judgment
6.

Utah Underground Storage Tank Act
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Tabl

EXHIBIT 1
COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL ACCRUAL DATES TO THE
STATE'S ACTUAL FILING DATE OF SEPTEMBER 16,1998
Date that Event
Occurred Which
Arguably Triggered
Accrual of the
State's Claims

Date that the
Statute of
Limitations
Terminated the
State's Claims

Record
Cite

Brent Redd informs the State November 13, 1992
that he is unable to cleanup the
Site.

November 13, 1995

Redd Depo.
R. at 902 at
p. 147.

State advises Brent Redd that March 18, 1993 (letter)
his "failure to comply" with the
UST Act could result in
liability under the UST Act.

March 18, 1996

R. at 542-44

State determines that it will August 3, 1994
perform its own cleanup of the (internal
Site as Brent Redd will not memorandum)
cleanup the Site himself.

August 3, 1997

R. at 550-51

State obtains funding for April 13, 1995 (letter)
cleanup at the Site and seeks
access to the Site from Brent
Redd.

April 13, 1998

R. at 553

State contractors begin cleanup April 18, 1995
and investigation at the Site.
(invoice)

April 18,1998

R. at 555-56

Contractor invoices State for April 30,1995
investigation and cleanup at the (invoices)

April 30,1998

R. at 555

Event that Arguably
Triggered Accrual of the
State's Claims

421481 1

Event that Arguably
Triggered Accrual of the
State's Claims

; Site.

Date that Event
Occurred Which
Arguably Triggered
Accrual of the
State's Claims

Date that the
Statute of
Limitations
Terminated the
State's Claims

Record
Cite

(invoices)

State accounting records show May 5, 1995 (state
! cost disbursements related to accounting records)
the Site.

May 5, 1998

R. at 591617

State approves first contractor June 4, 1995 (invoice)
invoice for payment of Site
I investigation and cleanup costs.

June 4, 1998

R. at 555

! State pays first contractor June 21, 1995 (state
1 invoice for Site investigation accounting records)
and cleanup costs.

June 21, 1998

R. at 592

Each payment, regardless of Variable
how long overdue, creates a (Trial Court Ruling)
1 separate cause of action and
with it, a separate statute of
limitations.

Variable

R. at 816

Tab 2

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION;
and KENT GRAY, Executive Secretary
of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste
Board,

RULING ON DEFENDANT
MARATHON OIL COMPANY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
VS
Civil No. 9807-167
K BRENT REDD, SHERRUX JEAN
REDD, WOODY'S ENTERPRISES
LTD, BILL C BUHLER,
MARATHON OIL COMPANY and
SHELL OIL COMPANY,

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

Defendants.

Defendant Marathon Oil Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that the
plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the three year statute of limitations set forth in UCA 78-1226(4) The plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to which the defendant filed a Reply
Memorandum Oral argument was heard on March 31, 2000, and the court took the matter under
advisement and now issues this ruling
The plaintiff urges the court to rule that (1) all elements of plaintiffs' cause of action
accrued well outside the 3 year statute of limitations, and (2) the cause of action accrued in this
case upon the failure of the Site's current owners and operators to conduct investigation and
cleanup required by plaintiffs pursuant to the Underground Storage Tank Act. The plaintiffs
claim that a new cause of action accrues upon each payment of cleanup costs made by the
plaintiffs with recovery being limited to costs incurred during the three years immediately prior
to the filing of the complaint.

The court rejects the defendant's theory as to when the cause of action occurred and is
persuaded that the plaintiffs' cause of action in this case accrued when a cleanup cost payment
was made by the plaintiffs. Because the complaint wasfiledin this case on August 12, 1998, the
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost payments made by plaintiffs
more than 3 years prior to thefilingof the complaint. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost payments made by the plaintiffs more than
three years prior to thefilingof the complaint on August 12, 1998.
DATED this pO

day of May, 2000.
c ^

r^ce K. Bryner, Judge
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DAVID W. TUNDERMANN (3897)
J. MICHAEL BAILEY (4965)
RICHARD J. ANGELL (7460)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Marathon Oil Company
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, DIVISION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE AND
REMEDIATION; and KENT GRAY
Executive Secretary of the Utah and
Hazardous Waste Control Board,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER ON MARATHON OIL
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

Civil Case No. 9807-167
Judge Bryce K. Bryner

vs.
K. BRENT REDD, et al.,
Defendant.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

The Court having considered the pleadings of the parties and relevant law and oral
arguments, and pursuant to and consistent with the Court's Memorandum Decision filed October

369288 1

3, 2000, pertaining to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Marathon Oil
Company, hereby enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court rejects the defendant's theory as to when the cause of action

occurred and is persuaded that the plaintiffs' cause of action in this case accrued when a cleanup
cost payment was made by the plaintiffs.
2.

Because the Complaint was filed in this case on September 16, 1998, the

Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost payments made by plaintiffs
more than 3 years prior to the filing of the complaint.
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court enters the following
Order:
ORDER
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost
payments made by the plaintiffs more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint on
September 16, 1998.
DATED this / /

2
day of November, 2000.
,THE COURT

Approved as to form:

" ^ ^ ^ ^ S e v e r a l District Court

Paul M. McConkie, A s s i s t a n t
£ t?!orney General for P l a i n t i f f s
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Fred Silvester
Silvester & Conroy
230 South 5tp East, Suite 590
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

\mC)

Margo Yufoafc,(Deputy Clerk

Tab 4

Sar» Juan County
CLED

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR c
SAN J U A N C O U N T Y , STATE OF U T A H

U T A H D E P A R T M E N T OF
E N V I R O N M E N T A L QUALITY,
DIVISION OF E N V I R O N M E N T A L
RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION;
and K E N T G R A Y , Executive Secretary
of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste
Board,
Plaintiffs,

OCT - 2 2000

DEFUT^

RULING ON D E F E N D A N T K. B R E N T
REDD AND WOODY'S ENTERPRISES
L T D ' S M O T I O N FOR S U M M A R Y
J U D G M E N T , and R U L I N G ON M O T I O N
T O STRIKE T H E A F F I D A V I T O F
RANDY GORDON

VS.
Civil No. 9807-167
K B R E N T R E D D , SHERRJLL J E A N
REDD, WOODY'S ENTERPRISES
LTD., BILL C. BUHLER,
M A R A T H O N OIL C O M P A N Y and
SHELL OIL C O M P A N Y ,

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

Defendants.

The defendants Redd and W o o d y ' s Enterprises (hereinafter the "defendants") filed a
Motion for Summary Judgement alleging that the plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the three year
statute of limitations set forth in U C A 78-12-26(4). The plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in
Opposition and a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition together with an affidavit of Randy
Gordon. A Reply Memorandum and a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Randy Gordon were
filed by the defendants . Oral argument was heard on March 3 1 , 2000, and the court took the
matter under advisement. The court has considered the memorandum, the arguments of counsel,
and the law and now issues this ruling.

I. The Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Randy Gordon
The defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Randy Gordon and a
Memorandum in Support dated January 21 st , 2000, which claim that the affidavit is hearsay and
is not the best evidence of when the DEQ first incurred any costs. The plaintiffs responded by
filing a Response dated February 2, 2000, and a supplemental affidavit of Randy Gordon
together with an accompanying data base spread sheet for the purpose of correcting the alleged
deficiencies. The defendants filed a Reply Memorandum dated February 9, 2000, which requests
that the multiple affidavits be stricken " . . . because DEQ has still failed to provide any adequate
foundation for the affidavit or any indicia of its authenticity..."
The defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Randy Gordon is granted for the reason
that the data base entries attached to the supplemental affidavit, which are summaries of the
business records, are not the business records themselves. Although a summary may be
admissible if the actual records themselves are made available for inspection, there is nothing in
the record to show that the plaintiffs have met their burden of making the records themselves,
i.e., invoices, receipts submitted from contract providers, and in house receipts and time logs as
set forth in paragraph 6 of the supplemental affidavit, available for examination to the
satisfaction of the defendants. The court therefore finds that the foundational requirements of
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006, have not been met and the summary (data base spread sheet)
is inadmissible and the affidavit is therefore hearsay .

II. The Motion for Summary Judgment
It is undisputed in the parties' memorandum that the statute of limitations in this instance
is three years, that the three year period ". . . begins to run when the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action occurs," and that the complaint was filed on August 12, 1998.

A. The Issue Presented
The issue before this court is: When did the last event necessary to complete the cause of
action occurr?
B. Positions of the Parties
The defendants contend that plaintiffs complaint sounds in subrogation, not
indemnification, and that the cause of action was complete on August 12, 1994, when DEQ sent
a letter to the Redd defendants, confirming them as the owners of a facility containing leaking
underground storage tanks which were the cause of soil and ground water contamination. The
defendants also claim that the cause of action in a subrogation case accrues at the time of injury,
not at the time of payment. (Underlining added). The defendants further assert that because the
plaintiffs knew of the injury to the property by August 12, 1994, if not sooner, the complaint
should have been filed within three years thereafter.
The plaintiffs contend that this is a statutory indemnification case and that the cause of
action was not complete until the plaintiffs made a payment on the underlying claim. The
plaintiffs further contend that UCA 78-12-26(4) provides for the accrual of a cause of action at
the time each payment is made by plaintiffs.
C. Ruling
The Utah Appellate Courts have not addressed the issue of when the statute of
limitations begins to run in the context of a LUST cast. Absent such authority, the court is
persuaded that the law of indemnification applies and that the last act necessary to complete a
cause of action occurs when a cleanup cost payment is made by the plaintiffs. The court also
finds that each payment is the accrual of a new cause of action under UCA 78-12-26(4). The
court limits these claims, however, to the costs actually paid within the three years immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint.
Because the complaint was filed on August 12, 1998, the Motion for Summary Judgment

is denied as to any cleanup costs paid by plaintiffs before August 12, 1995. Plaintiffs counsel is
directed to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling
DATED this ^-°

day of May, 2000.

T3ryce K. Bryner, Judge
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PAUL MMcCONKIE (Utah Bar No. 5881)
Assistant Attorney General
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Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION; and KENT
GRAY Executive Secretary of the Utah
and Hazardous Waste Control Board,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER ON K. BRENT
REDD AND WOODY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 9807-167

K. BRENT REDD, et al.
Defendants,

The Court having considered the pleadings of the parties and relevant law and oral
arguments, and pursuant to and consistent with the Court's Memorandum Decision filed October
3, 2000, pertaining to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants K. Brent Redd and
Woody's Enterprises, Ltd., hereby enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court rejects the defendant's theory as to when the cause of action

occurred and is persuaded that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued when a cleanup cost
payment was made by the plaintiffs.
2.

Because the Complaint was filed in this case on September 16, 1998, the

Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost payments made by plaintiffs
more than 3 years prior to the filing of the complaint
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court enters the following
Order:
ORDER
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost
payments made by the plaintiffs more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint on
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HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

19-6-401

(2) (a) The executive director may receive funds from any responsible party
that signs a voluntary agreement allowing the executive director to:
(i) review any proposals outlining how the investigation or cleanup
action is to be performed; and
(ii) oversee the investigation or cleanup action,
(b) Funds received by the executive director under this section shall be
deposited in the fund and used by the executive director as provided in the
voluntary agreement.
(3) If a responsible party fails to perform as required under a voluntary
agreement entered into under this part, the executive director may take action
and seek penalties to enforce the agreement as provided in the agreement.
(4) The executive director may not use the provisions of Section 19-6-310,
19-6-316, or 19-6-318 to recover costs received or expended pursuant to a
voluntary agreement from any person not a party to that agreement.
(5) (a) Any party who incurs costs under a voluntary agreement in excess of
his liability may seek contribution from any other party who is or may be
liable under this part for the excess costs in district court.
(b) In resolving claims made under Subsection (5)(a), the court shall
allocate costs using the standards in Subsection 19-6-310(2).
(6) This section takes precedence over conflicting provisions in this chapter
regarding agreements with responsible parties to conduct an investigation or
cleanup action.
History: C. 1953, 26-14d-901, enacted by
L. 1991, ch. 194, § 4; renumbered as 19-6322 by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 242; recodified as
19-6-325.
Compiler's Notes. — This section was enacted as § 26-14d-901; L. 1991, ch. 112, § 242
directed that this section be renumbered as
§ 19-6-322 and that the internal references be

renumbered, but this section was renumbered
as § 19-6-325 by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel because of the
creation by ch. 112 of another § 19-6-322.
Laws 1991, ch. 112, § 242(10)(c) directs that
"executive" be inserted before "director"
throughout.

PART 4
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK ACT
Sunset Act. — See Section 63-55-219 for the repeal date of this part.

19-6-401. Short title.
This part is known as the "Underground Storage Tank Act."
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-101, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 2; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 170.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments —
Environmental Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 236.

AX.R. — State and local government control
of pollution from underground storage tanks,
11 A.L.R.5th 388.

19-6-402

19-6-402.

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CODE

Definitions,

As used in this part:
(1) "Abatement action" means action taken to limit, reduce, mitigate, or
eliminate a release from an xmderground storage tank or petroleum
storage tank, or to limit or reduce, mitigate, or eliminate the damage
caused by that release.
(2) "Board" means the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board
created in Section 19-1-106.
(3) "Bodily injury" means bodily harm, sickness, disease, or death
sustained by any person.
(4) "Certificate of compliance" means a certificate issued to a facility by
the executive secretary:
(a) demonstrating that an owner or operator of a facility containing
one or more petroleum storage tanks has met the requirements of this
part; and
(b) listing all tanks at the facility, specifying which tanks may
receive petroleum and which tanks have not met the requirements for
compliance.
(5) "Certificate of registration" means a certificate issued to a facility by
the executive secretary demonstrating that an owner or operator of a
facility containing one or more underground storage tanks has:
(a) registered the tanks; and
(b) paid the annual underground storage tank fee.
(6) (a) "Certified underground storage tank consultant" means any
person who:
(i) meets the education and experience standards established
by the board under Subsection 19-6-403(l)(a)(vi) in order to
provide or contract to provide information, opinions, or advice
relating to underground storage tank management, release
abatement, investigation, corrective action, or evaluation for a
fee, or in connection with the services for which a fee is charged;
and
(ii) has submitted an application to the board and received a
written statement of certification from the board,
(b) "Certified underground storage tank consultant" does not include:
(i) an employee of the owner or operator of the underground
storage tank, or an employee of a business operation that has a
business relationship with the owner or operator of the underground storage tank, and that markets petroleum products or
manages underground storage tanks; or
(ii) persons licensed to practice law in this state who offer only
legal advice on underground storage tank management, release
abatement, investigation, corrective action, or evaluation.
(7) "Closed" means an underground storage tank no longer in use that
has been:
(a) emptied and cleaned to remove all liquids and accumulated
sludges; and
(b) either removed from the ground or filled with an inert solid
material.
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(8) "Corrective action plan" means a plan for correcting a release from
a petroleum storage tank that includes provisions for all or any of the
following:
(a) cleanup or removal of the release;
(b) containment or isolation of the release;
(c) treatment of the release;
(d) correction of the cause of the release;
(e) monitoring and maintenance of the site of the release;
(f) provision of alternative water supplies to persons whose drinking water has become contaminated by the release; or
(g) temporary or permanent relocation, whichever is determined by
the executive secretary to be more cost-effective, of persons whose
dwellings have been determined by the executive secretary to be no
longer habitable due to the release.
(9) "Costs" means any monies expended for:
(a) investigation;
(b) abatement action;
(c) corrective action;
(d) judgments, awards, and settlements for bodily injury or property damage to third parties;
(e) legal and claims adjusting costs incurred by the state in
connection with judgments, awards, or settlements for bodily injury or
property damage to third parties; or
(f) costs incurred by the state risk manager in determining the
actuarial soundness of the fund.
(10) "Covered by the fund" means the requirements of Section 19-6-424
have been met.
(11) "Dwelling" means a building that is usually occupied by a person
lodging there at night.
(12) "Enforcement proceedings" means a civil action or the procedures
to enforce orders established by Section 19-6-425.
(13) "Executive secretary" means the executive secretary of the board.
(14) "Facility" means all underground storage tanks located on a single
parcel of property or on any property adjacent or contiguous to that parcel.
(15) "Fund" means the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund created in
Section 19-6-409.
(16) "Loan fund" means the Petroleum Storage Tank Loan Fund created
in Section 19-6-405.3.
(17) "Operator" means any person in control of or who is responsible on
a daily basis for the maintenance of an underground storage tank that is
in use for the storage, use, or dispensing of a regulated substance.
(18) "Owner" means:
(a) in the case of an underground storage tank in use on or after
November 8, 1984, any person who owns an underground storage
tank used for the storage, use, or dispensing of a regulated substance;
and
(b) in the case of any underground storage tank in use before
November 8, 1984, but not in use on or after November 8, 1984, any
person who owned the tank immediately before the discontinuance of
its use for the storage, use, or dispensing of a regulated substance.

19-6-402
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(19) "Petroleum" includes crude oil or any fraction of crude oil that is
liquid at 60 degrees Fahrenheit and at a pressure of 14.7 pounds per
square inch absolute.
(20) "Petroleum storage tank* means a tank that:
(a) (i) is underground;
(ii) is regulated under Subtitle I of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 6991c, et seq.; and
(iii) contains petroleum; or
(b) is a tank that the owner or operator voluntarily submits for
participation in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund under
Section 19-6-415.
(21) "Petroleum Storage Tank Account" means the account created in
Section 19-6-405.5.
(22) "Program" means the Environmental Assurance Program under
Section 19-6-410.5.
(23) "Property damage" means physical injury to or destruction of
tangible property including loss of use of that property.
(24) "Regulated substance" means petroleum and petroleum-based substances comprised of a complex blend of hydrocarbons derived from crude
oil through processes of separation, conversion, upgrading, and finishing,
and includes motor fuels, jet fuels, distillate fuel oils, residual fuel oils,
lubricants, petroleum solvents, and used oils.
(25) "Release" means any spilling, leaking, emitting, discharging, escaping, leaching, or disposing from an underground storage tank or
petroleum storage tank. The entire release is considered a single release.
(26) (a) "Responsible party" means any person who:
(i) is the owner or operator of a facility;
(ii) owns or has legal or equitable title in a facility or an
underground storage tank;
(iii) owned or had legal or equitable title in the facility at the
time any petroleum was received or contained at the facility;
(iv) operated or otherwise controlled activities at the facility at
the time any petroleum was received or contained at the facility;
or
(v) is an underground storage tank installation company.
(b) "Responsible party" as defined in Subsections (26)(a)(i), (ii), and
(iii) does not include:
(i) any person who is not an operator and, without participating in the management of a facility and otherwise not engaged in
petroleum production, refining, and marketing, holds indicia of
ownership:
(A) primarily to protect his security interest in the facility;
or
(B) as a fiduciary or custodian under Title 75, Uniform
Probate Code, or under an employee benefit plan; or
(ii) governmental ownership or control of property by involuntary transfers as provided in CERCLA Section 101(20)(D), 42
U.S.C. Section 9601(20)(D).
(c) The exemption created by Subsection (b)(i)(B) does not apply to
actions taken by the state or its officials or agencies under this part.
(d) The terms and activities "indicia of ownership," "primarily to
protect a security interest," "participation in management," and
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"foreclosure on property and postforeclosure activities," under this
part shall be in accordance with 40 CFR 300.1100, National Contingency Plan.
(e) The terms "participation in management" and "indicia of ownership" as defined in 40 CFR 300.1100, National Contingency Plan,
include and apply to the fiduciaries listed in Subsection (26)(b)(i)(B).
(27) "Soil test" means a test, established or approved by board rule, to
detect the presence of petroleum in soil.
(28) "State cleanup appropriation" means the money appropriated by
the Legislature to the department to fund the investigation, abatement,
and corrective action regarding releases not covered by the fund.
(29) "Underground storage tank" means any tank regulated under
Subtitle I, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Section
6991c, et seq., including:
(a) a petroleum storage tank;
(b) underground pipes and lines connected to a storage tank; and
(c) any underground ancillary equipment and containment system.
(30) "Underground storage tank installation company" means any person, firm, partnership, corporation, governmental entity, association, or
other organization who installs underground storage tanks.
(31) "Underground storage tank installation company permit" means a
permit issued to an underground storage tank installation company by the
executive secretary.
(32) "Underground storage tank technician" means a person employed
by and acting under the direct supervision of a certified underground
storage tank consultant to assist in carrying out the functions described in
Subsection (6)(a).
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-102, enacted by deleted u to be eligible for payments of costs
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 3; 1990, ch. 301, § 1; from the fund regarding any release meeting
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 171; the requirements of Section 19-6-424" from the
1992, ch. 30, § 49; 1992, ch. 214, § 1; 1992, end of Subsection (4)(a); inserted "Trust" in
ch.280, § 6; 1993,ch. 240, § 2; 1994,ch. 297, Subsection (15); redesignated Subsection
§ 1; 1996, ch. 79, § 27; 1997, ch. 172, § 1.
(20)(a) as (20)(a)(i), redesignating former SubAmendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- sections (20)(b) and (20)(c) as (20)(a)(ii) and
ment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsections (20)(a)(iii), and added Subsection (20)(b); redes(6), (26), and (29) to (31), renumbering the other ignated former Subsection (28) as Subsection
subsections accordingly; rewrote Subsection
(21) and added Subsection (22), redesignating
(16), which formerly defined "fund surplus"; subsections accordingly; in Subsection (21) suband added Subsection (24)(a)(v), making re- stituted "Petroleum" for "Underground"; in
lated changes.
Subsection (28) deleted "under Section 19-6The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 409" after "department" and "and not on the
1996, deleted "and 40 CFR 300.1105, National national priority list as defined in Section 19Contingency Plan" from the end of Subsection
6-302" after "fund"; updated references in Sub(24)(b)(ii) and made a stylistic change.
sections (6) and (26); and made stylistic
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, changes.

19-6-402,5. Retroactive effect,
(1) The Legislature finds the definitions in this part prior to the passage of
this act did not clearly set forth procedures for identifying responsible parties
and interfered with effective allocation of costs of cleanup as required by this
part.

19-6-403

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CODE

(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that this act provides clarification
regarding procedures for allocating responsibility for the costs of investigation,
abatement, and corrective action as required under this part.
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature that this part imposes liability as
determined under this part retroactively to any release of petroleum or any
other regulated substance subject to investigation, abatement, or corrective
action under this part.
History: C. 1953,19-6-402.5, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 214, § 2.

19-6-403. Powers and duties of board*
(1) (a) The board shall regulate underground storage tanks and petroleum
storage tanks by applying the provisions of this part and by making rules
for:
(i) certification of tank installers, inspectors, testers, and removers;
(ii) registration of tanks;
(iii) administration of the petroleum storage tank program;
(iv) format and required information regarding records to be kept
by tank owners or operators who are participating in the fund;
(v) voluntary participation in the fund for above ground petroleum
storage tanks and tanks exempt from regulation under 40 C.F.R., Part
280, Subpart (B), and specified in Section 19-6-415; and
(vi) certification of underground storage tank consultants, including requirements for minimum education or experience, which rules
shall recognize the educational background of a professional engineer
licensed under Title 58, Chapter 22, Professional Engineers and Land
Surveyors Licensing Act, as meeting the education requirements for
certification, but shall require proof of experience that meets certification requirements,
(b) The board shall make rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, adopting requirements for
underground storage tanks contained in Subtitle I of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 6991c, et seq., and other
future applicable final federal regulations.
(2) The board shall ensure that the rules made under the authority of
Subsection (1) meet federal requirements for the state's assumption of primacy
in the regulation of underground storage tanks, as provided in Section 9004 of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 6991c, et seq.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-201, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 4; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 172; 1994, ch. 297, § 2; 1997,
ch. 172, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsection

(l)(a)(v) and made related changes.
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997,
added Subsection (D(aXiv), redesignating subsections accordingly, and in Subsection (l)(a)(v)
added "above ground petroleum storage tanks
and."

19-6-404. Powers and duties of executive secretary.
(1) The executive secretary shall administer the petroleum storage tank
program established in this part.
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(2) As necessary to meet the requirements or carry out the purposes of this
part, the executive secretary may:
(a) advise, consult, and cooperate with other persons;
(b) employ persons;
(c) authorize a certified employee or a certified representative of the
department to conduct facility inspections and reviews of records required
to be kept by this part and by rules made under this part;
(d) encourage, participate in, or conduct studies, investigation, research, and demonstrations;
(e) collect and disseminate information;
(f) enforce rules made by the board and any requirement in this part by
issuing notices and orders;
(g) review plans, specifications, or other data;
(h) represent the state in all matters pertaining to interstate underground storage tank management and control, including, with the concurrence of the executive director, entering into interstate compacts and other
similar agreements;
(i) enter into contracts or agreements with political subdivisions for the
performance of any of the department's responsibilities under this part if:
(i) the contract or agreement is not prohibited by state or federal
law and will not result in a loss of federal funding; and
(ii) the executive secretary determines that:
(A) the political subdivision is willing and able to satisfactorily
discharge its responsibilities under the contract or agreement;
and
(B) the contract or agreement will be practical and effective;
(j) take any necessary enforcement action authorized under this part;
(k) require an owner or operator of an underground storage tank to:
(i) furnish information or records relating to the tank, its equipment, and contents;
(ii) monitor, inspect, test, or sample the tank, its contents, and any
surrounding soils, air, or water; or
(iii) provide access to the tank at reasonable times;
(1) take any abatement, investigative, or corrective action as authorized
in this part; and
(m) enter into agreements or issue orders to apportion percentages of
liability of responsible parties under Section 19-6-424.5.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 19-6-414(3), appeals of
decisions made by the executive secretary under this part shall be made to the
board.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-202, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 5; r e n u m b e r e d by Lu
1991, ch. 112, § 173; 1992, ch. 214, § 3; 1997,
ch. 172, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsection (1)

deleted "underground storage tank program
and" before "petroleum"; in Subsection (2)(c)
substituted the language beginning "facility
inspections and" for "inspections"; and made
one stylistic change,
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Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1992, ch. 280, § 62 repeals
this section, as last amended by L. 1991, ch.
112, § 174, relating to availability of records,

reports, and information, effective July 1,1992.
For comparable provisions, see Title 63, Chapter 2.

19-6-405.3. Creation of Petroleum Storage Tank Loan
Fund — Purposes — Loan eligibility — Loan
restrictions — Rulemaking.
(1) There is created the revolving loan fund entitled the Petroleum Storage
Tank Loan Fund.
(2) The sources of monies for the loan fund are:
(a) appropriations to the loan fund;
(b) principal and interest received from the repayment of loans made by
the executive secretary under Subsection (3); and
(c) all investment income derived from money in the fund.
(3) The executive secretary may loan, in accordance with this section,
monies available in the loan fund to persons to be used for:
(a) upgrading petroleum storage tanks and associated piping with
corrosion protection, or spill and overfill prevention equipment as necessary to meet the federal deadline required under 40 CFR 280.21;
(b) replacing underground storage tanks; or
(c) permanently closing underground storage tanks.
(4) A person may apply to the executive secretary for a loan under Subsection (3) if all tanks owned or operated by t h a t person are in substantial
compliance with all state and federal requirements or will be brought into
substantial compliance using money from the loan fund.
(5) The executive secretary shall consider loan applications under Subsection (4) to meet the following objectives:
(a) support availability of gasoline in rural parts of the state;
(b) support small businesses; and
(c) reduce the threat of a petroleum release endangering the environment.
(6) Loans made under this section shall:
(a) be for no more than $45,000 for all tanks at any one facility;
(b) be for no more than $15,000 per tank;
(c) be for no more than 80% of the total cost of:
(i) upgrading a tank and associated piping to meet requirements of
40 CFR 280.21;
(ii) replacing the underground storage tank; or
(iii) permanently closing the underground storage tank;
(d) have a fixed annual interest rate of 3%;
(e) have a term no longer than ten years;
(f) be made on the condition the loan applicant obtains adequate
security for the loan as established by board rule under Subsection (7); and
(g) comply with rules made by the board under Subsection (7).
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, the board shall make rules establishing:
(a) form, content, and procedure for loan applications;
(b) criteria and procedures for prioritizing loan applications;
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(c) requirements and procedures for securing loans;
(d) procedures for making the loans;
(e) procedures for administering and ensuring repayment of loans,
including late payment penalties; and
(f) procedures for recovering on defaulted loans.
(8) The decisions of the executive secretary in loaning money from the loan
fund and otherwise administering the loan fund are not subject to Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(9) The Legislature shall appropriate monies for administration of the loan
fund to the department from the loan fund.
(10) The executive secretary may enter into agreements with public entities
or private organizations to perform any tasks associated with administration
of the loan fund.
History: C. 1953,19-6-405.3, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 297, § 3Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 297,
§ 16 makes the act effective on July 1, 1994.
Appropriations. — Laws 1996, ch. 162, § 4

appropriates, for the fiscal year 1996-1997,
$2,000,000 from the Petroleum Storage Tank
Fund to the Petroleum Storage Tank Loan
Fund.

19-6-405.5. Creation of restricted account.
(1) There is created in the General Fund a restricted account known as the
Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account.
(2) All penalties and interest imposed under this part shall be deposited in
this account, except as provided in Section 19-6-410.5. Specified program funds
under this part that are unexpended at the end of the fiscal year lapse into this
account.
(3) The Legislature shall appropriate the money in the account to the
department for the costs of administering the petroleum storage tank program
under this part.
History: C. 1953,19-6-405.5, enacted by L.
1992, ch- 214, § 4; 1997, ch. 172, § 4; 1998,
ch. 95, § 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, added the subsection designations; changed the name of the
account, which had been "Underground Storage Tank Account*; and substituted "petroleum"
for "underground" in Subsection (3).

The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998,
in the first sentence of Subsection (2) inserted
"and interest" near the beginning and "except
as provided in Section 19-6-410.5" at the end.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1997, ch. 172,
which amended this section, directs in § 25 that
all funds currently in the Underground Storage
Tank Restricted Account be transferred to the
Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account.

19-6-405.7. Petroleum Storage Tank Cleanup Fund —
Revenue and purposes.
(1) There is created an expendable trust fund entitled the Petroleum
Storage Tank Cleanup Fund, which is referred to in this section as the cleanup
fund.
(2) The cleanup fund sources of revenue are:
(a) any voluntary contributions received by the department for the
cleanup of facilities;
(b) legislative appropriations made to the cleanup fund; and
(c) costs recovered under this part.
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(3) The cleanup fund shall earn interest, which shall be deposited in the
cleanup fund.
(4) The executive secretary may use the cleanup fund monies for administration, investigation, abatement action, and preparing and implementing a
corrective action plan regarding releases not covered by the Petroleum Storage
Tank Trust Fund created in Section 19-6-409.
History: C. 1953,19-6-405,7, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 255, § 1.

19-6-406.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 255, § '
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1992, ch. 214, § 26 repeals
§ 19-6-406, as renumbered and amended by
Laws 1991, ch. 112, § 175, relating to abate-

ment or corrective action for underground stor
age tank release, effective April 27, 1992. Fo
present comparable provisions, see § 19-6-420

19-6-407. Underground storage tank registration —
Change of ownership or operation — Civil pen
alty.
(1) (a) Each owner or operator of an underground storage tank shal
register the tank with the executive secretary if the tank:
(i) is in use; or
(ii) was closed after January 1, 1974.
(b) If a new person assumes ownership or operational responsibilities
for an underground storage tank, that person shall inform the executive
secretary of the change within 30 days after the change occurs.
(c) Each installer of an underground storage tank shall notify th<
executive secretary of the completed installation within 60 days followinj
the installation of an underground storage tank.
(2) The executive secretary may issue a notice of agency action assessing
civil penalty in the amount of $1,000 if an owner, operator, or installer, of
petroleum or underground storage tank fails to register the tank or provid
notice as required in Subsection (1).
(3) The penalties collected under authority of this section shall be deposite
in the Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account created in Section 19-6
405.5.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-301, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 9; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 176; 1992, ch. 214, § 5; 1994,
ch. 297, § 4; 1997, ch. 172, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsection
(lXc) and in Subsection (2) substituted "opera-

tor, or installer" for "or operator" and "or pr
vide notice as required" for "as provided."
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 199
i n Subsection (3) substituted "Petroleum Sto
age Tank Restricted Account" for a Undergrour
Storage Tank Account."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"In use" construed.
Underground storage tank that contained
one to one and one-half inches of a substance
with detectable levels of petroleum hydrocar-

bons was "in use" and, therefore, subject
regulation under this part. V-l Oil Co. v. E
partment of EnvtT Quality, 904 R2d 214 (Utj
Ct. App. 1995).
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19-6-408. Underground storage tank registration fee —
Processing fee for tanks not in the program.
(1) The department may assess an annual underground storage tank
registration fee against owners or operators of underground storage tanks that
have not been closed. These fees shall be:
(a) billed per facility;
(b) due on July 1 annually;
(c) deposited with the department as dedicated credits;
(d) used by the department for the administration of the underground
storage tank program outlined in this part; and
(e) established under Section 63-38-3.2.
(2) (a) In addition to the fee under Subsection (1), an owner or operator who
elects to demonstrate financial assurance through a mechanism other
than the Environmental Assurance Program shall pay a processing fee of:
(i) for fiscal year 1997-98, $1,000 for each financial assurance
mechanism document submitted to the division for review; and
(ii) on and after July 1, 1998, a processing fee established under
Section 63-38-3.2.
(b) If a combination of financial assurance mechanisms is used to
demonstrate financial assurance, the fee under Subsection (2)(a) shall be
paid for each document submitted.
(c) As used in this Subsection (2), "financial assurance mechanism
document" may be a single document that covers more than one facility
through a single financial assurance mechanism.
(3) Any funds provided for administration of the underground storage tank
program under this section that are not expended at the end of the fiscal year
lapse into the Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account created in Section
19-6-405.5.
(4) The executive secretary shall provide all owners or operators who pay
the annual underground storage tank registration fee a certificate of registration.
(5) (a) The executive secretary may issue a notice of agency action assessing
a civil penalty of $1,000 per facility if an owner or operator of an
underground storage tank facility fails to pay the required fee within 60
days after the July 1 due date.
(b) The registration fee and late payment penalty accrue interest at
12% per annum.
(c) If the registration fee, late payment penalty, and interest accrued
under this subsection are not paid in full within 60 days after the July 1
due date any certificate of compliance issued prior to the July 1 due date
lapses. The executive secretary may not reissue the certificate of compliance until full payment under this subsection is made to the department.
(d) The executive secretary may waive any penalty assessed under this
subsection if no fuel has been dispensed from the tank on or after July 1,
1991.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-302, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 10; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 177; 1992, ch. 214, § 6; 1994,

ch. 297, § 5; 1995, ch. 28, § 9; 1997, ch. 172,
§ 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
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ment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsection
(5)(d).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995,
substituted "63-38-3.2" for "63-38-3" in Subsection (3).
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997,
added Subsections (l)(e) and (2), making one

stylistic change; redesignated former Subsection (2) as (3), substituting "Petroleum Storage
Tank Restricted Account" for "Underground
Storage Tank Account"; and deleted former
Subsection (3) which read: "In establishing
fees, the department shall follow the procedures of Section 63-38-3.2."

19-6-409. Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund created —
Source of revenues*
(1) (a) There is created an expendable trust fund entitled the Petroleum
Storage Tank Trust Fund.
(b) The sole sources of revenues for the fund are:
(i) petroleum storage tank fees under Section 19-6-411;
(ii) underground storage tank installation company permit fees
under Section 19-6-411;
(iii) the environmental assurance fee and any penalties, paid under
Section 19-6-410.5; and
(iv) any interest accrued on these revenues.
(c) Interest earned on fund monies shall be deposited into the fund.
(2) Fund monies may be used to pay:
(a) costs as provided in Section 19-6-419; and
(b) for the administration of the fund and the environmental assurance
program and fee under Section 19-6-410.5.
(3) Costs for the administration of the fund and the environmental assurance fee shall be appropriated by the Legislature.
(4) The executive secretary may expend monies from the fund for:
(a) legal and claims adjusting costs incurred by the state in connection
with claims, judgments, awards, or settlements for bodily injury or
property damage to third parties;
(b) costs incurred by the state risk manager in determining the actuarial soundness of the fund; and
(c) other costs as provided in this part.
(5) For fiscal year 1997-98, money in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust
Fund, up to a maximum of $2,200,000, may be appropriated by the Legislature
to the department as nonlapsing funds to be applied to the costs of investigation, abatement, and corrective action regarding releases not covered by the
fund and not on the national priority list as defined in Section 19-6-302.
(6) The Legislature may appropriate $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998-99 from
the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund to the Petroleum Storage Tank
Cleanup Fund created in Section 19-6-405.7.
(7) For fiscal year 1998-99, up to $5,000,000 in the Petroleum Storage Tank
Fund carried forward to the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund may be
appropriated by the Legislature to the Centennial Highway Trust Fund.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-401, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 11; 1990, ch. 301, § 2;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 178;
1992, ch. 214, § 7; 1994, ch. 297, § 6; 1997,
ch. 172, § 7; 1997, ch. 272, § 1; 1998, ch. 95,
§ 2; 1998, ch. 255, § 2; 1998, ch. 417, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsection

(D(bXii), renumbering former Subsections
(l)(b)(ii) and (iii) as Subsections (IXbXiii) and
(iv); rewrote Subsection (5)(a) as present Subsection (5) and redesignated former Subsections (5Xb) and (c) as Subsection (6), making
related internal designation and reference
changes; and substituted "Subsections (3) and
(5Xb)" for "this section" and inserted "or com-
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nutted" m Subsection (6)(c)
The 1997 amendment by ch 172, effective
May 5, 1997, inserted "Trust" m Subsection
(XXa), substituted "assurance fee paid" for "surcharge assessed" in Subsection (l)(b)(iu), updated references in Subsections (l)(b)(m) and
(2Xa), m Subsection (2Kb) substituted "assurance program and fee under Section 19-6-410 5"
for "surcharge", m Subsection (3) substituted
"assurance fee" for "surcharge", deleted former
Subsections (5) and (6) concerning the appropriation of the money in the Petroleum Storage
Tank Fund by the Legislature, and added Subsection (5)
The 1997 amendment by ch 272, effective
May 5, 1997, deleted Subsection (D(bXin)
which read "the environmental surcharge assessed under Section 19-6-410, and," redesignating former Subsection (lXb)(iv) as (lXbXm),
and deleted "and the environmental surcharge"
after "fund" in Subsections (2Kb) and (3)
The 1998 amendment by ch 417, effective
May 4, 1998, added Subsection (6) (Subsection
(7) in the reconciled version)
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The 1998 amendment by ch 95, effective July
1,1998, inserted "and any penalties" in Subsection (lXbXui), and added Subsection (lXbXv)
(Subsection (IXbXiv) m the reconciled version),
making a related change
The 1998 amendment by ch 255, effective
July 1, 1998, deleted former Subsection
(IXbXiv) which read "costs recovered under this
part," making a related change, and added
Subsection (6)
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel
Coordination clause. — Laws 1997, chs
172 and 272 each amended this section, ch 272,
§ 9 provides that the amendments to this section in ch 172 supersede the amendments to
the same section in ch 272
Appropriations. — Laws 1998, ch 255, § 6
appropriates from the Petroleum Storage Tank
Fund, for fiscal year 1998-99, $2,000,000 to the
Petroleum Storage Tank Cleanup Fund
Cross-References. — Civil penalty for violation, § 19-6-425

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1997, ch 172, § 26, and ch
272, § 7, both effective May 5, 1997, repeal §
19-6-410, as last amended by L 1993 (2nd S S ),
ch 1, § 1, concerning an environmental surcharge on petroleum For provisions relating to
the voluntary environmental assurance fund,
see § 19-6-410 5
This section had been held to violate Utah
Const, Art XIII, Sec 13, to the extent that the

surcharge was levied on motor fuels as defined
in that section of the constitution, in V-l Oil Co
v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 302 Utah Adv Rep
30 (Utah 1996) rev'd, 323 Utah Adv Rep 5
(Utah 1997)
Coordination clause. — Laws 1997, ch
330 attempted to amend this section, however,
ch 172, § 27 provides that the repeal in ch 172
supersedes the amendment in ch 330

19-6-410.5. Environmental assurance program — Participant fee.
(1) As used in this section, "commission" means the State Tax Commission,
as defined under Section 59-1-101.
(2) There is created an Environmental Assurance Program. The program
shall provide to participating owners and operators, upon payment of the fee
imposed under Subsection (4), assistance with the costs of investigation,
abatement, and corrective action regarding releases at facilities participating
m the program, to the extent provided under Section 19-6-419.
(3) Participation in the program is voluntary.
(4) There is assessed an environmental assurance fee of VA cent per gallon on
the first sale or use of petroleum products in the state.
(5) Revenue collected under this section shall be used solely for the purposes
under Section 19-6-409.
(6) (a) The commission is responsible for the collection of the fee and any
penalties and interest imposed under this section.
(b) The commission shall by rule establish*
(i) the method of payment of the environmental assurance fee;

19-6-411

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CODE

(ii) the procedure for reimbursement or exemption of owners or
operators who do not participate in the program, including owners
and operators of above ground storage tanks; and
(iii) the procedure for confirming with the department those owners and operators who qualify for reimbursement or exemption under
Subsection (6)(b)(ii).
(c) The commission may retain an amount not to exceed 2.5% of fees
collected under this section for the cost to it of rendering its services.
(7) The person or entity responsible for payment of the fee under this section
shall pay the fee to the commission on or before the last day of the month
following the month in which the sale occurs.
(8) The payment under this section shall be accompanied by the form
prescribed by the commission.
(9) (a) The penalties and interest for failure to file the form required under
this section or to pay the environmental assurance fee are the same as the
penalties and interest under Sections 59-1-401 and 59-1-402.
(b) The commission shall deposit penalties and interest collected under
this section in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund.
(10) The commission shall report to the department any person or entity
who is delinquent in payment of the fee under this section.
History: C. 1953,19-6-410.5, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 172, § 8; 1998, ch. 95, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, rewrote the section.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 172
became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

19-6-411. Petroleum storage tank fee for program participants.
(1) In addition to the underground storage tank registration fee paid in
Section 19-6-408, the owner or operator of a petroleum storage tank who elects
to participate in the environmental assurance program under Section 19-6410.5 shall also pay an annual petroleum storage tank fee to the department
for each facility as follows:
(a) on and after July 1, 1990, through J u n e 30, 1993, an annual fee of:
(i) $250 for each tank:
(A) located at a facility engaged in petroleum production,
refining, or marketing; or
(B) with an annual monthly throughput of more than 10,000
gallons; and
(ii) $125 for each tank:
(A) not located at a facility engaged in petroleum production,
refining, or marketing; and
(B) with an annual monthly throughput of 10,000 gallons or
less;
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(b) on and after July 1, 1993, through J u n e 30, 1994, an annual fee of:
(i) $150 for each tank:
(A) located at a facility engaged in petroleum production,
refining, or marketing; or
(B) with an average monthly throughput of more than 10,000
gallons; and
(ii) $75 for each tank:
(A) not located at a facility engaged in petroleum production,
refining, or marketing; and
(B) with an average monthly throughput of 10,000 gallons or
less; and
(c) on and after July 1, 1994, an annual fee of:
(i) $50 for each tank in a facility with an annual facility throughput
rate of 400,000 gallons or less;
(ii) $150 for each tank in a facility with an annual facility throughput rate of more than 400,000 gallons; and
(iii) $150 for each tank in a facility regarding which:
(A) the facility's throughput rate is not reported to the department within 30 days after the date this throughput information is
requested by the department; or
(B) the owner or operator elects to pay the fee under this
subsection, rather than report under Subsection (l)(c)(i) or (ii);
and
(d) on and after July 1, 1998, for any new tank:
(i) which is installed to replace an existing tank at an existing
facility, any annual petroleum storage tank fee paid for the current
fiscal year for the existing tank is applicable to the new tank; and
(ii) installed at a new facility or at an existing facility, which is not
a replacement for another existing tank, the fees are as provided in
Subsection (l)(c) of this section.
(2) (a) As a condition of receiving a permit and being eligible for benefits
under Section 19-6-419 from the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund,
each underground storage tank installation company shall pay to the
department the following fees to be deposited in the fund:
(i) an annual fee of:
(A) $2,000 per underground storage tank installation company
if the installation company has installed 15 or fewer underground
storage tanks within the 12 months preceding the fee due date; or
(B) $4,000 per underground storage tank installation company
if the installation company has installed 16 or more underground
storage tanks within the 12 months preceding the fee due date;
and
(ii) $200 for each underground storage tank installed in the state,
to be paid prior to completion of installation,
(b) The board shall make rules specifying which portions of an underground storage tank installation shall be subject to the permitting fees
when less than a full underground storage tank system is installed.
(3) (a) Fees under Subsection (1) are due on or before July 1 annually.
(b) If the department does not receive the fee on or before July 1, the
department shall impose a late penalty of $60 per facility.
(c) (i) The fee and the late penalty accrue interest at 12% per annum.
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(ii) If the fee, the late penalty, and all accrued interest are not
received by the department within 60 days after July 1, the eligibility
of the owner or operator to receive payments for claims against the
fund lapses on the 61st day after July 1.
(iii) In order for the owner or operator to reinstate eligibility to
receive payments for claims against the fund, the owner or operator
shall meet the requirements of Subsection 19-6-428(3).
(4) (a) (i) Fees under Subsection (2)(a)(i) are due on or before July 1
annually. If the department does not receive the fees on or before July
1, the department shall impose a late penalty of $60 per installation
company. The fee and the late penalty accrue interest at 12% per
annum.
(ii) If the fee, late penalty, and all accrued interest due are not
received by the department within 60 days after July 1, the underground storage tank installation company's permit and eligibility to
receive payments for claims against the fund lapse on the 61st day
after July 1.
(b) (i) Fees under Subsection (2)(a)(ii) are due prior to completion of
installation. If the department does not receive the fees prior to
completion of installation, the department shall impose a late penalty
of $60 per facility. The fee and the late penalty accrue interest at 12%
per annum.
(ii) If the fee, late penalty, and all accrued interest are not received
by the department within 60 days after the underground storage tank
installation is completed, eligibility to receive payments for claims
against the fund for that tank lapse on the 61st day after the tank
installation is completed.
(c) The executive secretary may not reissue the underground storage
tank installation company permit until the fee, late penalty, and all
accrued interest are received by the department.
(5) If the state risk manager determines the fees established in Subsections
(1) and (2) and the environmental assurance fee established in Section
19-6-410.5 are insufficient to maintain the fund on an actuarially sound basis,
he shall petition the Legislature to increase the petroleum storage tank and
underground storage tank installation company permit fees, and the environmental assurance fee to a level t h a t will sustain the fund on an actuarially
sound basis.
(6) The executive secretary may waive all or part of the fees required to be
paid on or before May 5, 1997, for a petroleum storage tank under this section
if no fuel has been dispensed from the tank on or after July 1, 1991.
(7) (a) Each petroleum storage tank or underground storage tank, for which
payment of fees has been made and other requirements have been met to
qualify for a certificate of compliance under this part, shall be issued a
form of identification, as determined by the board under Subsection (7)(b).
(b) The board shall make rules providing for the identification, through
a tag or other readily identifiable method, of petroleum storage tanks or
underground storage tanks under Subsection (7)(a) t h a t qualify for a
certificate of compliance under this part.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-402, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 12; 1990, ch. 301, § 4;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 180;

1992, ch. 214, § 9; 1994, ch. 297, § 7;
1995,ep;bal;j ch. 28, § 10; 1995, ch. 242, § 1;
1996, ch. 162, § 1; 1997, ch. 172, § 9; 1997,
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ch. 272, § 2; 1998, ch. 95, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "through
June 30, 1994" in the introductory language of
Subsection (1Kb), added Subsections (l)(c), (2),
(4)(b), and (10), making related changes, rewrote Subsection (3), inserted "or underground
storage tank installation company permit" in
Subsections (4)(a), (4Xc), (8)(a), and (8Kb), inserted "and underground storage tank installation company permit" in Subsection (5), substituted "fees under this section" for "the
petroleum storage tank fee" in Subsection
(6Xa), and inserted "or underground tank company" m Subsection (6)(b)
The 1995 amendment by ch 28, effective May
1, 1995, substituted "63-38-3 2" for "63-38-3" in
Subsection (6)(b)
The 1995 amendment by ch 242, effective
July 1, 1995, substituted "$150" for "$175" in
Subsection (lXcXm), added the (A) designation
and added Subsection (lXcXinXB), replaced
"63-38-3" with "63-38-3 2" m Subsection (6Xb),
rewrote the introductory language of Subsection (9), which read "Notwithstanding the provisions of this section," and made related
changes
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, deleted former Subsections (6) to (8),
relatmg to petroleum storage tank fees, redesignated subsequent subsections accordingly,
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and added Subsection (8)
The 1997 amendment by ch 172, effective
May 5, 1997, inserted "who elects to participate
in the environmental assurance program under
Section 19-6-410 5" in the introductory paragraph in Subsection (1), substituted "receiving
a permit and being eligible for benefits under
Section 19-6-419 from the Petroleum Storage
Tank Trust Fund" for "permitting" in the introductory paragraph m Subsection (2), rewrote
Subsections (3) and (4), m Subsection (5), substituted "assurance fee" for "surcharge" near
the beginning, corrected the reference, and inserted "and the environmental assurance fee"
near the end, and inserted "to be paid on or
before May 5, 1997" in Subsection (7)
The 1997 amendment by ch 272, effective
May 5, 1997, m Subsection (5) deleted "and the
environmental surcharge established in Section 19-6-410" after "Subsections (1) and (2) "
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998,
added Subsection (l)(d), and deleted former
Subsection (6) relating to the point of collection
of assurance fee, redesignating subsections and
internal references accordingly
Coordination clause. — Laws 1997, chs
172 and 272 each amended this section, ch 272,
§ 9 provides that the amendments to this section m ch 172 supersede the amendments to
the same section in ch 272

19-6-412. Petroleum storage tank — Certificate of compliance.
(1) (a) Beginning July 1, 1990, an owner or operator of a petroleum storage
tank may obtain a certificate of compliance for the facility.
(b) Effective July 1,1991, each owner or operator of a petroleum storage
tank shall have a certificate of compliance for the facility.
(2) The executive secretary shall issue a certificate of compliance if:
(a) the owner or operator has a certificate of registration;
(b) the owner or operator demonstrates it is participating in the
Environmental Assurance Program under Section 19-6-410.5, or otherwise demonstrates compliance with financial assurance requirements as
defined by rule;
(c) all state and federal statutes, rules, and regulations have been
substantially complied with; and
(d) all tank test requirements of Section 19-6-413 have been met.
(3) If the ownership of or responsibility for the petroleum storage tank
changes, the certificate of compliance is still valid unless it has been revoked
or has lapsed
(4) The executive secretary may issue a certificate of compliance for a period
of less than one year to maintain an administrative schedule of certification.
(5) The executive secretary shall reissue a certificate of compliance if the
owner or operator of an underground storage tank has complied with the
requirements of Subsection (2).
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(6) If the owner or operator electing to participate in the program has a
number of tanks in an area where the executive secretary finds it would be
difiScult to accurately determine which of the tanks may be the source of a
release, the owner may only elect to place all of the tanks in the area in the
program, but not just some of the tanks in the area.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-403, enacted by
in 1989, ch. 268, § 13; 1990, ch. 301, § 5;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 181;
1992, ch. 214, § 10; 1997, ch. 172, § 10.

Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amandmerit, effective May 5, 1997, rewrote Subsection (2)(b) and added Subsection (6).

19-6-413. Tank tightness test — Actions required after
testing*
(1) The owner or operator of any petroleum storage tank registered prior to
July 1, 1991, must submit to the executive secretary the results of a tank
tightness test conducted:
(a) on or after September 1, 1989, and prior to January 1, 1990, if the
test meets requirements set by rule regarding tank tightness tests t h a t
were applicable during that period; or
(b) on or after J a n u a r y 1, 1990, and prior to July 1, 1991.
(2) The owner or operator of any petroleum storage tank registered on or
after July 1,1991, must submit to the executive secretary the results of a tank
tightness test conducted within the six months before the tank was registered
or within 60 days after the date the tank was registered.
(3) If the tank test performed under Subsection (1) or (2) shows no release
of petroleum, the owner or operator of the petroleum storage tank shall submit
a letter to the executive secretary at the same time the owner or operator
submits the test results, stating that under customary business inventory
practices standards, the owner or operator is not aware of any release of
petroleum from the tank.
(4) (a) If the tank test shows a release of petroleum from the petroleum
storage tank, the owner or operator of the tank shall:
(i) correct the problem; and
(ii) submit evidence of the correction to the executive secretary,
(b) When the executive secretary receives evidence from an owner or
operator of a petroleum storage tank that the problem with the tank has
been corrected, the executive secretary shall:
(i) approve or disapprove the correction; and
(ii) notify the owner or operator t h a t the correction has been
approved or disapproved.
(5) The executive secretary shall review the results of the tank tightness
test to determine compliance with this part and any rules adopted under the
authority of Section 19-6-403.
(6) If the owner or operator of the tank is required by 40 C.F.R., Part 280,
Subpart D, to perform release detection on the tank, the owner or operator
shall submit the results of the tank tests in compliance with 40 C.F.R., P a r t
280, Subpart D.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-404, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 14; 1990, ch. 301, § 6;

renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 182;
1992, ch. 214, § 11.
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19-6-414. Grounds for revocation of certificate of compliance and ineligibility for payment of costs from
fund.
(1) If the executive secretary determines that any of the requirements of
Subsection 19-6-412(2) and Section 19-6-413 have not been met, the executive
secretary shall notify the owner or operator by certified mail that:
(a) his certificate of compliance may be revoked;
(b) if he is participating in the program, he is violating the eligibility
requirements for the fund; and
(c) he shall demonstrate his compliance with this part within 60 days
after receipt of the notification or his certificate of compliance will be
revoked and if participating in the program he will be ineligible to receive
payment for claims against the fund.
(2) If the executive secretary determines the owner's or operator's compliance problems have not been resolved within 60 days after receipt of the
notification in Subsection (1), the executive secretary shall send written notice
to the owner or operator that the owner's or operator's certificate of compliance
is revoked and he is no longer eligible for payment of costs from the fund.
(3) Revocation of certificates of compliance may be appealed to the executive
director.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-405, enacted by
in 1989, ch. 268, § 15; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 183; 1992, ch. 214, § 12;
1997, ch. 172, § 11.

Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amandment, effective May 5, 1997, added aif participating in the program" in Subsections (1Kb)
and (l)(c).

19-6-415. Participation of exempt and above ground
tanks.
(1) An underground storage tank exempt from regulation under 40 C.F.R.,
Part 280, Subpart A, may become eligible for payments from the Petroleum
Storage Tank Trust Fund if it:
(a) (i) is a farm or residential tank with a capacity of 1,100 gallons or
less and is used for storing motor fuel for noncommercial purposes;
(ii) is used for storing heating oil for consumptive use on the
premises where stored; or
(iii) is used for any oxygenate blending component for motor fuels;
(b) complies with the requirements of Section 19-6-412;
(c) meets other requirements established by rules made under Section
19-6-403; and
(d) pays registration and tank fees and environmental assurance fees,
equivalent to those fees outlined in Sections 19-6-408, 19-6-410.5, and
19-6-411.
(2) An above ground petroleum storage tank may become eligible for
payments from the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund if the owner or
operator:
(a) pays those fees that are equivalent to the registration and tank fees
and environmental assurance fees under Sections 19-6-408, 19-6-410.5,
and 19-6-411;
(b) complies with the requirements of Section 19-6-412; and
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(c) meets other requirements established by rules made under Section
19-6-403.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-406, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 16; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 184; 1992, ch. 214, § 13;
1997, ch. 172, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, designated the

former introductory paragraph as Subsection
(1), redesignating subsections accordingly; in
the introductory paragraph of Subsection (1)
added "Trust"; and added Subsections (lXd)
and (2).

19-6-415.5. State-owned underground tanks to participate in program.
Any underground storage tank owned or leased by the state of Utah and
subject to the financial assurance requirements established by division rule
shall participate in the program.
History: C. 1953,19-6-415.5, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 172, § 13.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 172

became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

19-6-416. Restrictions on delivery of petroleum — Civil
penalty.
(1) After July 1, 1991, a person may not deliver petroleum to, place
petroleum in, or accept petroleum for placement in a petroleum storage tank
that is not identified in compliance with Subsection 19-6-411(8).
(2) Any person who delivers or accepts delivery of petroleum to a petroleum
storage tank or places petroleum, including waste petroleum substances, in an
underground storage tank in violation of Subsection (1) is subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $500 for each occurrence.
(3) The executive secretary shall issue a notice of agency action assessing a
civil penalty of not more than $500 against any person who delivers or accepts
delivery of petroleum to a petroleum storage tank or places petroleum,
including waste petroleum substances, in violation of Subsection (1) in a
petroleum storage tank or underground storage tank.
(4) A civil penalty may not be assessed under this section against any person
who in good faith delivers or places petroleum in a petroleum storage tank or
underground storage tank that is identified in compliance with Subsection
19-6-411(8) and rules made under that subsection, whether or not the tank is
in actual compliance with the other requirements of Section 19-6-411.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-407, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 17; 1990, ch. 301, § 7;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 185;
1992, ch. 214, § 14; 1996, ch. 162, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote this
section, adding Subsection (4).

Compiler's Notes. — References to "Subsection 19-6-411(8r in Subsections (1) and (4)
should probably be to Subsection 19-6-411(7).
Laws 1998, ch. 95, § 4 deleted a subsection and
renumbered former Subsection 19-6-411(8) as
19-6-411(7).
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19-6-416.5, Restrictions on underground storage tank installation companies — Civil penalty.
(1) After July 1, 1994, no individual or underground installation company
may install an underground storage tank without having a valid underground
storage tank installation company permit.
(2) Any individual or underground storage tank installation company who
installs an underground storage tank in violation of Subsection (1) is subject to
a civil penalty of $500 per underground storage tank.
(3) The executive secretary shall issue a notice of agency action assessing a
civil penalty of $500 against any underground storage tank installation
company or person who installs an underground storage tank in violation of
Subsection (1).
History: C. 1953,19-6-416.5, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 297, § 8.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 297,
§ 16 makes the act effective on July 1, 1994.

19-6-417. Use of fund revenues to investigate certain releases from petroleum storage tank.
If the executive secretary is notified of or otherwise becomes aware of a
release or suspected release of petroleum, he may expend revenues from the
fund to investigate the release or suspected release if he has reasonable cause
to believe the release is from a tank that is covered by the fund.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-501, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 18; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 186; 1992, ch. 214, § 15;
1997, ch. 172, § 14.

Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, added "if he has
reasonable cause to believe..."to the end of the
provision.

19-6-418. Recovery of costs by executive secretary.
(1) The executive secretary may recover:
(a) from a responsible party the proportionate share of costs the party
is responsible for as determined under Section 19-6-424.5;
(b) any amount required to be paid by the owner under this part which
the owner has not paid; and
(c) costs of collecting the amounts in Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b).
(2) The executive secretary may pursue an action or recover costs from any
other person if that person caused or substantially contributed to the release.
(3) All costs recovered under this section shall be deposited in the Petroleum
Storage Tank Cleanup Fund created in Section 19-6-405.7.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-502, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 19; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 187; 1992, ch. 214, § 16;
1998, ch. 255, § 3.

Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendmerit, effective July 1, 1998, made two minor
stylistic changes in Subsection (l)(c), and added
Subsection (3).
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19-6-419- Costs covered by the fund — Costs paid by
owner or operator — Payments to third parties
— Apportionment of costs(1) If all requirements of this part have been met and a release occurs from
a tank that is covered by the fund, the costs per release shall be covered as
provided under this section.
(2) The responsible party shall pay:
(a) the first $10,000 of costs; and
(b) (i) all costs over $1,000,000, if the release was from a tank:
(A) located at a facility engaged in petroleum production,
refining, or marketing; or
(B) with an average monthly facility throughput of more than
10,000 gallons; and
(ii) all costs over $500,000, if the release was from a tank:
(A) not located at a facility engaged in petroleum production,
refining, or marketing; and
(B) with an average monthly facility throughput of 10,000
gallons or less.
(3) If money is available in the fund and the responsible party has paid costs
of $10,000, the executive secretary shall pay costs from the fund in an amount
not to exceed:
(a) $990,000 if the release was from a tank:
(i) located at a facility engaged in petroleum production, refining,
or marketing; or
(ii) with an average monthly facility throughput of more than
10,000 gallons; and
(b) $490,000 if the release was from a tank:
(i) not located at a facility engaged in petroleum production,
refining, or marketing; and
(ii) with an average monthly facility throughput of 10,000 gallons
or less.
(4) The total costs of tank releases regarding any responsible party that may
be paid in any fiscal year by fund monies are:
(a) $990,000 for a responsible party of one to 99 petroleum storage
tanks; or
(b) $1,990,000 for a responsible party of 100 or more petroleum storage
tanks.
(5) (a) In authorizing payments for costs from the fund, the executive
secretary shall apportion monies first to legal, adjusting, and actuarial
expenses incurred by the state; expenses incurred in investigation, abatement action, and corrective action; and then to payment of judgments,
awards, or settlements to third parties for bodily injury or property
damage.
(b) The board shall make rules governing the apportionment of costs
among third party claimants.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-503, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 20; 1990, ch. 301, § 8;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 188;
1991, ch. 252, § 1; 1992, ch. 214, § 17; 1994,

ch. 297, § 9; 1996, ch. 162, § 3; 1997, ch. L72,
§ 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, redesignated
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former Subsections (lXa) and (b) as Subsections (2) and (3), redesignating former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (4) and (5),
making related internal designation changes in
present Subsections (2) and (3), and making a
related stylistic change at the end of Subsection
CD; substituted "$10,000 of costs if the release
occurred on or before July 1 1996" for "$25 000
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rewrote the introductory language of Subsections (3), (3)(a), and (3Xb); and rewrote Subsection (4).
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, deleted all references to the dates and
deductible costs of release throughout this sec^on
The
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Recovery of costs.
The provision allowing the secretary to recover costs from owner, § 19-6-424.5, is construed to provide for recovery of costs in the
limited situations where the Fund has paid to
clean up a spill and the owner has not covered

the first $10,000, the Fund has paid more than
the $990,000 authorized under this section, or
the owner is not covered because it lacks a
compliance certificate. V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 942 R2d 906 (Utah 1997).

19-6-420. Releases — Abatement actions — Corrective
actions*
(1) If the executive secretary determines that a release from a petroleum
storage tank has occurred, he shall:
(a) identify and name as many of the responsible parties as reasonably
possible; and
(b) determine which responsible parties, if any, are covered by the fund
regarding the release in question.
(2) Regardless of whether the tank generating the release is covered by the
fund, the executive secretary may:
(a) order the owner or operator to take abatement, investigative, or
corrective action, including the submission of a corrective action plan; and
(b) if the owner or operator fails to take any of the abatement,
investigative, or corrective action ordered by the executive secretary, the
executive secretary may take any one or more of the following actions:
(i) subject to the conditions in this part, use monies from the fund,
if the tank involved is covered by the fund, state cleanup appropriation, or the Petroleum Storage Tank Cleanup Fund created under
Section 19-6-405.7 to perform investigative, abatement, or corrective
action;
(ii) commence an enforcement proceeding;
(iii) enter into agreements or issue orders as allowed by Section
19-6-424.5; or
(iv) recover costs from responsible parties equal to their proportionate share of liability as determined by Section 19-6-424.5.
(3) (a) Subject to the limitations established in Section 19-6-419, the
executive secretary shall provide monies from the fund for abatement
action for a release generated by a tank covered by the fund if:
(i) the owner or operator takes the abatement action ordered by the
executive secretary; and
(ii) the executive secretary approves the abatement action.
(b) If a release presents the possibility of imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or the environment, the owner or operator may
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take immediate abatement action and petition the executive secretary for
reimbursement from the fund for the costs of the abatement action. If the
owner or operator can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the executive
secretary t h a t the abatement action was reasonable and timely in light of
circumstances, the executive secretary shall reimburse the petitioner for
costs associated with immediate abatement action, subject to the limitations established in Section 19-6-419.
(c) The owner or operator shall notify the executive secretary within 24
hours of the abatement action taken.
(4) (a) If the executive secretary determines corrective action is necessary,
the executive secretary shall order the owner or operator to submit a
corrective action plan to address the release.
(b) If the owner or operator submits a corrective action plan, the
executive secretary shall review the corrective action plan and approve or
disapprove the plan.
(c) In reviewing the corrective action plan, the executive secretary shall
consider the following:
(i) the threat to public health;
(ii) the threat to the environment; and
(iii) the cost-effectiveness of alternative corrective actions.
(5) If the executive secretary approves the corrective action plan or develops
his own corrective action plan, he shall:
(a) approve the estimated cost of implementing the corrective action
plan;
(b) order the owner or operator to implement the corrective action plan;
(c) (i) if the release is covered by the fund, determine the amount of
fund monies to be allocated to an owner or operator to implement a
corrective action plan; and
(ii) subject to the limitations established in Section 19-6-419,
provide monies from the fund to the owner or operator to implement
the corrective action plan.
(6) (a) The executive secretary may not distribute any monies from the fund
for corrective action until the owner or operator obtains the executive
secretary's approval of the corrective action plan.
(b) An owner or operator who begins corrective action without first
obtaining approval from the executive secretary and who is covered by the
fund may be reimbursed for the costs of the corrective action, subject to the
limitations established in Section 19-6-419, if:
(i) the owner or operator submits the corrective action plan to the
executive secretary within seven days after beginning corrective
action; and
(ii) the executive secretary approves the corrective action plan.
(7) If the executive secretary disapproves the plan, he shall solicit a new
corrective action plan from the owner or operator.
(8) If the executive secretary disapproves the second corrective action plan,
or if the owner or operator fails to submit a second plan within a reasonable
time, the executive secretary may:
(a) develop his own corrective action plan; and
(b) act as authorized under Subsections (2) and (5).
(9) (a) When notified that the corrective action plan has been implemented,
the executive secretary shall inspect the location of the release to deter-
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mine whether or not the corrective action has been properly performed
and completed.
(b) If the executive secretary determines the corrective action has not
been properly performed or completed, he may issue an order requiring
the owner or operator to complete the corrective action within the time
specified in the order.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-601, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 21; 1990, ch. 301, § 9;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 189;
1992, ch. 214, § 18; 1994, ch. 297, § 10; 1997,
ch. 172, § 16; 1998, ch. 255, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "state
cleanup appropriation" for "fund surplus" in
Subsection (2)(b)(i).
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997,
in Subsection (2) substituted "tank generating

the release is" for "responsible parties are"; in
Subsection (2XbXi) added "if the tank involved
is covered by the fund"; and in Subsection (3Xa)
added "for a release generated by a tank covered by the fund."
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998,
i n Subsection (2)(bXi) inserted "or the Petroi e u m Storage Tank Cleanup Fund created un19-6-405.7," making a related
der Section
cnange

19-6-421. Third party payment restrictions and requirements,
(1) If there are sufficient revenues in the fund, and subject to the provisions
of Sections 19-6-419, 19-6-422, and 19-6-423, the executive secretary shall
authorize payment from the fund to third parties regarding a release covered
by the fund as provided in Subsection (2) if:
(a) (i) he is notified t h a t a final judgment or award has been entered
against the responsible party covered by the fund that determines
liability for bodily injury or property damage to third parties caused
by a release from the tank; or
(ii) approved by the state risk manager, the responsible party has
agreed to pay an amount in settlement of a claim arising from the
release; and
(b) the responsible party has failed to satisfy the judgment or award, or
pay the amount agreed to.
(2) The executive secretary shall authorize payment to the third parties of
the amount of the judgment, award, or amount agreed to subject to the
limitations established in Section 19-6-419.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-602, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 22; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 190; 1992, ch. 214, § 19;
1993, ch. 188, § 1; 1997, ch. 172, § 17.

Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5,1997, added "regarding a
release covered by the fund" in Subsection (1).

19-6-422. Participation by state risk manager in suit,
claim, or settlement,
(1) If a suit is filed or a claim is made against a responsible party who is
eligible for payments from the fund for bodily injury or property damage
connected with a release of petroleum from a petroleum storage tank, the state
risk manager and his legal counsel may participate with the responsible party
and his legal counsel in:
(a) the defense of any suit;
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(b) determination of legal strategy and any other decisions affecting the
defense of any suit; and
(c) any settlement negotiations.
(2) The state risk manager shall approve any settlement between the
responsible party and a third party before payment of fund monies is made.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-603, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 23; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 191; 1992, ch. 214, § 20.

Cross-References.
§ 63A-4-101 et seq.

—

Risk

manager,

19-6-423. Claim or suit against responsible parties —
Prerequisites for payment from fund to responsible parties or third parties — Limitations of
liability for third party claims.
(1) In order to be eligible for payments from the fund, if a responsible party
receives actual or constructive notice of an occurrence likely to give rise to a
claim, that a suit has been filed, or a claim has been made against him for
bodily injury or property damage connected with a release of petroleum from
a petroleum storage tank, the responsible party shall:
(a) inform the state risk manager immediately of the occurrence, suit,
or claim;
(b) allow the state risk manager and his legal counsel to participate
with the responsible party and his legal counsel in:
(i) the defense of any suit;
(ii) determination of legal strategy and any other decisions affecting the defense of any suit; and
(hi) any settlement negotiations; and
(c) conduct the defense of any suit or claim in good faith.
(2) The executive secretary may not authorize payment of fund monies for
any judgment or award to third parties unless the state risk manager:
(a) indicates t h a t he was not prevented from participating in the
defense of the suit; and
(b) approves the settlement.
(3) In making payments to third parties from the fund pursuant to Section
19-6-421, or in funding a corrective action plan pursuant to Section 19-6-420,
the executive secretary may not pay an award or judgment or fund a corrective
action plan to the extent that it imposes any liability or makes any payment
for:
(a) obligations of a responsible party under a workers' compensation,
disability benefits, or unemployment compensation law or other similar
law;
(b) bodily injury to an employee of the responsible party arising from
and in the course of his employment or to the spouse, child, parent,
brother, sister, heirs, or personal representatives of that employee as a
result of that bodily injury;
(c) bodily injury or property damage arising from the ownership,
maintenance, use, or entrustment to others of any aircraft, motor vehicle,
or watercraft;
(d) property damage to any property owned by, occupied by, rented to,
loaned to, bailed to, or otherwise in the care, custody, or control of the
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owner or operator except to the extent necessary to complete a corrective
action plan;
(e) bodily injury or property damage for which the responsible party is
obligated to pay damages only by reason of the assumption of liability in
a contract or agreement, other than a contract or agreement entered into
to meet the financial responsibility requirements of Subtitle I of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 6991c, et seq.,
or this part, or regulations or rules made under either of them;
(f) bodily injury or property damage for which the responsible party is
liable to a third party solely on account of personal injury to the spouse of
that third party;
(g) bodily injury or property damage caused by a release from a
petroleum storage tank covered by the fund or the cost of a corrective
action plan, where the total amount previously paid by the executive
secretary to compensate third parties or for funding a corrective action
plan in respect to that same accidental release from the covered tank
equals $990,000; or
(h) bodily injury or property damage caused by a release from a
petroleum storage tank covered by the fund or the cost of a corrective
action plan when the total amount previously paid by the executive
secretary to compensate third parties or for funding corrective action
plans in respect to releases from tanks of any one responsible party during
any fiscal year equals $990,000 for a responsible party regarding one to 99
petroleum storage tanks or $1,990,000 for a responsible party regarding
100 or more petroleum storage tanks.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-604, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 24; 1990, ch. 301, § 10;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 192;
1991, ch. 252, § 2; 1992, ch. 214, § 21; 1997,
ch. 172, § 18.

Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend
ment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsections
(3)(g) and (3)(h) substituted "$990,000" for
"$975,000" and substituted "$1,990,000" for
"$1,975,000" in Subsection (3Xh).

19-6-424. Claims not covered by fund.
(1) The executive secretary may not authorize payments from the fund
unless:
(a) the claim was based on a release occurring during a period for which
that tank was covered by the fund;
(b) the claim was made:
(i) during a period for which that tank was covered by the fund; or
(ii) (A) within one year after that fund-covered tank is closed; or
(B) within six months after the end of the period during which
the tank was covered by the fund; and
(c) there are sufficient revenues in the fund.
(2) The executive secretary may not authorize payments from the fund for
an underground storage tank installation company unless:
(a) the claim was based on a release occurring during the period prior to
the issuance of a certificate of compliance;
(b) the claim was made within 12 months after the date the tank is
issued a certificate of compliance for that tank; and
(c) there are sufficient revenues in the fund.
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(3) The executive secretary may require the claimant to provide additional
information as necessary to demonstrate coverage by the fund at the time of
submittal of the claim.
(4) If the Legislature repeals or refuses to reauthorize the program for
petroleum storage tanks established in this part, the executive secretary may
authorize payments from the fund as provided in this part for claims made
until the end of the time period established in Subsection (1) or (2) provided
there are sufficient revenues in the fund.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-605, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 25; 1991, ch. 112, § 193;
1992, ch. 214, § 22; 1997, ch. 172, § 19.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsection
(lXa) and (lXb)(i) deleted "a responsible party
holds or has previously held a valid certificate
of compliance for" before "that tank" and added
"was covered by the fund" thereafter; redesig-

nated Subsection (D(bXii) as (lXbXiiXA); in
Subsection (lXbXiiXA) deleted "the end of a
period during which the responsible party held
a valid certificate of compliance for" after "year
after" and added "fund-covered" and "is closed;
or"; added Subsections (D(bXiiXB), (2), and (3),
redesignating former Subsection (2) as (4); and
in Subsection (4) added "or (2)" after the first
reference.

19-6-424.5. Apportionment of liability — Liability agreements — Legal remedies — Amounts recovered.
(1) After providing notice and opportunity for comment to responsible
parties identified and named under Section 19-6-420, the executive secretary
may:
(a) issue written orders determining responsible parties;
(b) issue written orders apportioning liability among responsible parties; and
(c) take action, including legal action or issuing written orders, to
recover costs from responsible parties, including costs of any investigation,
abatement, and corrective action performed under this part.
(2) (a) In any apportionment of liability, whether made by the executive
secretary or made in any administrative proceeding or judicial action, the
following standards apply:
(i) liability shall be apportioned among responsible parties in
proportion to their respective contributions to the release; and
(ii) the apportionment of liability shall be based on equitable
factors, including the quantity, mobility, persistence, and toxicity of
regulated substances contributed by a responsible party, and the
comparative behavior of a responsible party in contributing to the
release, relative to other responsible parties.
(b) (i) The burden of proving proportionate contribution shall be borne
by each responsible party.
(ii) If a responsible party does not prove his proportionate contribution, the court, the board, or the executive secretary shall apportion
liability to the party based on available evidence and the standards of
Subsection (2)(a).
(c) The court, the board, or the executive secretary may not impose joint
and several liability
(d) Each responsible party is strictly liable for his share of costs.
(3) The failure of the executive secretary to name all responsible parties is
not a defense to an action under this section.
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(4) The executive secretary may enter into an agreement with any responsible party regarding that party's proportionate share of liability or any action
to be taken by that party.
(5) The executive secretary and a responsible party may not enter into an
agreement under this part unless all responsible parties named and identified
under Subsection 19-6-420(l)(a):
(a) have been notified in writing by either the executive secretary or the
responsible party of the proposed agreement; and
(b) have been given an opportunity to comment on the proposed
agreement prior to the parties' entering into the agreement.
(6) (a) Any party who incurs costs under this part in excess of his liability
may seek contribution from any other party who is or may be liable under
this part for the excess costs in the district court.
(b) In resolving claims made under Subsection (6)(a), the court shall
allocate costs using the standards in Subsection (2).
(7) (a) A party who has resolved his liability under this part is not liable for
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the agreement or
order.
(b) (i) An agreement or order determining liability under this part does
not discharge any of the liability of responsible parties who are not
parties to the agreement or order, unless the terms of the agreement
or order expressly provide otherwise.
(ii) An agreement or order determining liability made under this
subsection reduces the potential liability of other responsible parties
by the amount of the agreement or order.
(8) (a) If the executive secretary obtains less than complete relief from a
party who has resolved his liability under this section, the executive
secretary may bring an action against any party who has not resolved his
liability as determined in an order.
(b) In apportioning liability, the standards of Subsection (2) apply.
(c) A party who resolved his liability for some or all of the costs under
this part may seek contribution from any person who is not a party to the
agreement or order.
(9) (a) An agreement or order determining liability under this part may
provide that the executive secretary will pay for costs of actions that the
parties have agreed to perform, but which the executive secretary has
agreed to finance, under the terms of the agreement or order.
(b) If the executive secretary makes payments from the fund or state
cleanup appropriation, he may recover the amount paid using the authority of Section 19-6-420 and this section or any other applicable authority.
(c) Any amounts recovered under this section shall be deposited in the
Petroleum Storage Tank Cleanup Fund created under Section 19-6-405.7.
History: C. 1953,19-6-424.5, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 214, § 23; 1994, ch. 297, § 11; 1998,
ch. 255, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "state

cleanup appropriation" for "fund surplus" in
Subsection (9)(b).
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998,
made a minor stylistic change in Subsections
(2)(b)(ii) and (6)(b), and added Subsection (9)(c).
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Recovery of costs.
This section is construed to provide for recovery of costs in the limited situations where the
Fund has paid to clean up a spill and the owner
has not covered the first $10,000, the Fund has

paid more than the $990,000 authorized under
§ 19-6-419, or the owner is not covered because
it lacks a compliance certificate. V-l Oil Co. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah
1997).

19-6-425. Violation of part — Civil penalty — Suit in
district court.
(1) Except as provided in Section 19-6-407, any person who violates any
requirement of this part or any order issued or rule made under the authority
of this part is subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 per day for
each day of violation.
(2) The executive secretary may enforce any requirement, rule, agreement,
or order issued under this part by bringing a suit in the district court in the
county where the underground storage tank or petroleum storage tank is
located.
(3) The department shall deposit the penalties collected under this part in
the Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account created under Section 19-6405.5.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-606, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 26; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 194; 1992, ch. 214, § 24;
1997, ch. 172, § 20.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1997 amend-

ment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsection (3)
substituted "Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account" for "Underground Storage
Tank Account."

19-6-426. Limitation of liability of state — Liability of
responsible parties — Indemnification agreement involving responsible parties.
(1) This part is not intended to create an insurance program.
(2) The fund established in this part shall only provide funds to finance costs
for responsible parties who meet the requirements of this part when releases
from petroleum storage tanks occur.
(3) The assets of the fund, if any, are the sole source of monies to pay claims
against the fund.
(4) The state is not liable for:
(a) any amounts payable from the fund for which the fund does not have
sufficient assets;
(b) any expenses or debts of the fund; or
(c) any claim arising from the creation, management, rate-setting, or
any other activity pertaining to the fund.
(5) The responsible parties are liable for any costs associated with any
release from the underground storage tank system.
(6) This part does not preclude a responsible party from enforcing or
recovering under any agreement or contract for indemnification associated
with a release from the tank or from pursuing any other legal remedies that
may be available against any party.
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(7) If any payment is made under this part, the fund shall be subrogated to
all the responsible parties' rights of recovery against any person or organization and the responsible parties shall execute and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure the rights. The responsible
parties shall do nothing after a release is discovered to prejudice the rights. In
the event of recovery by the fund, any amount recovered shall first be used to
reimburse the responsible parties for costs they are required to pay pursuant
to Section 19-6-419.
(8) Parties who elect to participate in the fund do so subject to the conditions
and limitations in this section and in this part.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-701, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 27; 1990, ch. 301, § 11;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch, 112, § 195;
1992, ch. 214, § 25; 1997, ch. 172, § 21.

Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, added Subsection
(8).

19-6-427. Liability of any person under other laws —
Additional state and governmental immunity —
Exceptions.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), nothing in this part affects or
modifies in any way:
(a) the obligations or liability of any person under any other provision of
this part or state or federal law, including common law, for damages,
injury, or loss resulting from a release or substantial threat of a release of
petroleum from an underground storage tank or a petroleum storage tank;
or
(b) the liability of any person for costs incurred except as provided in
this part.
(2) In addition to the governmental immunity granted in Title 63, Chapter
30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the state and its political subdivisions
are not liable for actions performed under this part except as a result of
intentional misconduct or gross negligence including reckless, willful, or
wanton misconduct.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-702, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 28; renumbered by L.
1991, ch. 112, § 196.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Tort liability for pollution from
underground storage tank, 5 A.L.R.5th 1.

19-6-428. Eligibility for participation in the fund.
(1) All owners and operators of existing petroleum storage tanks that are
covered by the fund on May 5, 1997, may elect to continue to participate in the
program by meeting the requirements of this part, including paying the tank
fees and environmental assurance fee as provided in Sections 19-6-410.5 and
19-6-411.
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(2) Any new petroleum storage tanks installed after May 5, 1997, or tanks
ehgible under Section 19-6-415, may elect to participate in the program by
complying with the requirements of this part.
(3) All owners and operators of petroleum storage tanks who elect to not
participate in the program, including by the use of an alternative financial
assurance mechanism, shall comply with the following requirements in order
to subsequently participate in the program:
(a) perform a tank tightness test and site check, including soil and
groundwater samples to demonstrate no release of petroleum exists or
adequate remediation of releases as required by board rules; and
(b) comply with the requirements of this part.
History: C. 1953, 19-0-428, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 172, § 22; 1998, ch. 95, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, substituted "the
following requirements" for "this Subsection
(3)" in Subsection (3); and deleted former Subsection (3Xb) relating to remitting fees for

tanks not participating in the assurance program, redesignating former Subsection (3Xc) as
(3)(b).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 172
became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to
Utah Const. Art. VI, Sec. 25.

19-6-429. False information and claims*
(1) Any person who presents or causes to be presented any oral or written
statement, knowing the statement contains false information, in order to
obtain a certificate of compliance is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) (a) Any person who presents or causes to be presented any claim for
payment from the fund, knowing the claim contains materially false
information or knowing the claim is not eligible for payment from the
fund, is subject to the criminal penalties under Section 76-10-1801
regarding fraud.
(b) The level of criminal penalty shall be determined by the value
involved, in the same manner as in Section 76-10-1801.
History: C. 1953, 19-6-429, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 172, § 23.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 172
became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to

Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References.— Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

PART 5
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT
19-6-501. Short title.
This part is known as the "Solid Waste Management Act."
History: C. 1953, 26-32-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 31; renumbered by L. 1991,
ch. 112, § 197.

Cross-References. — Interstate Compact
on Low-Level Radioactive Waste, §§ 19-3-201
to 19-3-205.
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substantive requirements of CERCLA, he shall request that the responsible parties take additional actions to fulfill the agreement to implement
the remedial action plan.
(b) If the responsible parties refuse to comply with the request, the
executive director may take action to enforce the agreement.
History: C. 1953, 26-14d-704, enacted by
in 1989, ch. 190, § 22; renumbered by Lu
1991, ch. 112, § 165; 2001, ch. 275, § 5.

Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amandment, effective April 30, 2001, deleted "written"
before "notice" in Subsection (1).

PART 4
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK ACT
19-6-402, Definitions.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in V-l Oil Co. v. Division of Envtl.
Response & Remediation, 962 R2d 93 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998).

19-6-409. Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund created —
Source of revenues.
(1) (a) There is created an expendable trust fund entitled the Petroleum
Storage Tank Trust Fund.
(b) The sole sources of revenues for the fund are:
(i) petroleum storage tank fees under Section 19-6-411;
(ii) underground storage tank installation company permit fees
under Section 19-6-411;
(iii) the environmental assurance fee and any penalties, paid under
Section 19-6-410.5; and
(iv) any interest accrued on these revenues.
(c) Interest earned on fund monies shall be deposited into the fund.
(2) Fund monies may be used to pay:
(a) costs as provided in Section 19-6-419; and
(b) for the administration of the fund and the environmental assurance
program and fee under Section 19-6-410.5.
(3) Costs for the administration of the fund and the environmental assurance fee shall be appropriated by the Legislature.
(4) The executive secretary may expend monies from the fund for:
(a) legal and claims adjusting costs incurred by the state in connection
with claims, judgments, awards, or settlements for bodily injury or
property damage to third parties;
(b) costs incurred by the state risk manager in determining the actuarial soundness of the fund; and
(c) other costs as provided in this part.
(5) For fiscal year 1997-98, money in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust
Fund, up to a maximum of $2,200,000, may be appropriated by the Legislature
to the department as nonlapsing funds to be applied to the costs of investigation, abatement, and corrective action regarding releases not covered by the
fund and not on the national priority list as defined in Section 19-6-302.
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(6) The Legislature may appropriate $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998-99 from
the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund to the Petroleum Storage Tank
Cleanup Fund created in Section 19-6-405.7.
(7) For fiscal year 1998-99, up to $5,000,000 in the Petroleum Storage Tank
Fund carried forward to the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund may be
appropriated by the Legislature to the Centennial Highway Fund created
under Section 72-2-118.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-401, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 11; 1990, ch. 301, § 2;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 178;
1992, ch. 214, § 7; 1994, ch. 297, § 6; 1997,
ch. 172, § 7; 1997, ch. 272, § 1; 1998, ch. 95,
§ 2; 1998, ch. 255, § 2; 1998, ch. 417, § 2;
1999, ch. 21, § 18.

Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, in Subsection (7)
substituted "Centennial Highway Fund" for
"Centennial Highway Trust Fund" and added
"created under Section 72-2-118."

19-6-410.5. Environmental assurance program — Participant fee.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Cash balance" means cash plus investments and current accounts
receivable minus current accounts payable exclusive of the liabilities
estimated by the state risk manager.
(b) "Commission" means the State Tax Commission, as defined under
Section 59-1-101.
(2) There is created an Environmental Assurance Program. The program
shall provide to participating owners and operators, upon payment of the fee
imposed under Subsection (4), assistance with the costs of investigation,
abatement, and corrective action regarding releases at facilities participating
in the program, to the extent provided under Section 19-6-419.
(3) Participation in the program is voluntary.
(4) There is assessed an environmental assurance fee of VA cent per gallon on
the first sale or use of petroleum products in the state.
(5) Revenue collected under this section shall be deposited in the Petroleum
Storage Tank Trust Fund created in Section 19-6-409 and used solely for the
purposes under Section 19-6-409.
(6) (a) The commission is responsible for the collection of the fee and any
penalties and interest imposed under this section.
(b) The commission shall by rule establish:
(i) the method of payment of the environmental assurance fee;
(ii) the procedure for reimbursement or exemption of owners or
operators who do not participate in the program, including owners
and operators of above ground storage tanks; and
(iii) the procedure for confirming with the department those owners and operators who qualify for reimbursement or exemption under
Subsection (6)(b)(ii).
(c) The commission may retain an amount not to exceed 2.5% of fees
collected under this section for the cost to it of rendering its services.
(7) The person or entity responsible for payment of the fee under this section
shall pay the fee to the commission on or before the last day of the month
following the month in which the sale occurs.
(8) The payment under this section shall be accompanied by the form
prescribed by the commission.
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(9) (a) The penalties and interest for failure to file the form required under
this section or to pay the environmental assurance fee are the same as the
penalties and interest under Sections 59-1-401 and 59-1-402.
(b) The commission shall deposit penalties and interest collected under
this section in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund.
(10) The commission shall report to the department any person or entity
who is delinquent in payment of the fee under this section.
(11) (a) If the cash balance of the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund on
J u n e 30 of any year exceeds $40,000,000, the assessment of the environmental assurance fee as provided in Subsection (4) shall be suspended
beginning November 1 and the suspension shall remain in effect through
October 31 of the year in which the cash balance of the fund on J u n e 30 has
decreased to below $30,000,000.
(b) The commission shall be responsible for determining each year the
cash balance of the fund as of J u n e 30.
(c) Before September 1 of each year, the department shall provide the
commission with the accounts payable of the fund as of J u n e 30.
History: C. 1953,19-6-410.5, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 172, § 8; 1998, ch. 95, § 3; 1999, ch.
118, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, added Subsection

(l)(a); divided Subsection (1), adding the Subsection (l)(b) designation; inserted the phrase
beginning "deposited in" and ending "Section
19-6-409 and" in Subsection (5); added Subsection (11); and made a punctuation change.

19-6-416, Restrictions on delivery of petroleum — Civil
penalty.
(1) After July 1, 1991, a person may not deliver petroleum to, place
petroleum in, or accept petroleum for placement in a petroleum storage tank
that is not identified in compliance with Subsection 19-6-411(7).
(2) Any person who delivers or accepts delivery of petroleum to a petroleum
storage tank or places petroleum, including waste petroleum substances, in an
underground storage tank in violation of Subsection (1) is subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $500 for each occurrence.
(3) The executive secretary shall issue a notice of agency action assessing z
civil penalty of not more than $500 against any person who delivers or accepts
delivery of petroleum to a petroleum storage tank or places petroleum
including waste petroleum substances, in violation of Subsection (1) in z
petroleum storage tank or underground storage tank.
(4) A civil penalty may not be assessed under this section against any persoi
who in good faith delivers or places petroleum in a petroleum storage tank oi
underground storage tank that is identified in compliance with Subsectioi
19-6-411(7) and rules made under that subsection, whether or not the tank i
in actual compliance with the other requirements of Section 19-6-411.
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-407, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 17; 1990, ch. 301, § 7;
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 185;
1992, ch. 214, § 14; 1996, ch. 162, § 2; 1999,
ch. 21, § 19.

Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend
ment, effective May 3, 1999, substituted "Sut
section 19-6-411(7)" for "Subsection 19-€
411(8)" in Subsections (1) and (4).

